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van den Hurk was born on Kay 13, 1913 at

E1ndhoven (Netherlands).
He made h1s stud1es tor the pr1esthood in the
preparatory and major sem1naries ot the Mlsslonar1es ot the
Sacred Heart (Dutch Provlnce), beoomlng a member ot the order
on September 20, 1931.

Atter

~rdlnat10ft

on August 10, 1937,

he completed h1s theologlcal studles and was sent to the
Apostolio Vicariate ot Manado, whloh comprises the northern part
ot the Island of Celebes, Indones1a (tormer Dutch East Ind1es).
There he was apPOinted a teaoher ot philosoph1 at the Major
a_mlnary tor natives.

The oapture ot the ls1and b1 the

Japanese, January 10, 1942, stopped all mlssionary activlty;
all the missionaries spent the next three years and elght months
in prlson.

Post war condlt10ns made it imposslble to start the

seimlnary agaln atter 11beration (September 1945), and 'ather
van den Hurk was apPOinted pastor ot one ot the stations ot the
vicariate.

In addltlon, he beoame edltor ot the MalalaD

Oatholic month11 GeredJa Katollk.

Beoause ot the changed po11-

tioal sltuat10n hls Blshop sent him to the United States to
obta1n the masters degree in ph11osoph1 betore resum1ng h1s
taoulty post at the reopened semlnary.

Father van den Hurk

started his studles at L010la Univerelt, ln September 1950.
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GILSOR'S EPISTEMOLOGY.
INtRODUCTION.
Thomlsa 11ke ever1 818tea, aovement or 1001et" haa
1t8 oonservatlves and lta progresslve,.

Oonservatlves are those

who thlnk that the ,'rength ot Tboml.. 11es ln Itloklng as
010se17 al posslble to St. Thomal.

Aocord1ng to thea, he has

the solutlon to everT problem and questlon.

.

EYerT lnv.stlgatlon

ot the op1nlons ot modern Doft-thoailt1c thinkers ls sheer waste
ot tlme.

Nothlng can be ad4ed, and oertaln11 Rothlag oan be

altered in h1s phllosophloal teaoh1ngs.
summlt 1n his wrlting"

Phllos0ph1 reaohed It,

to whlch all later generatlons have to

go back as to the source ot all philosophlcal wisdca.

On the other hand, the progress1ve. are ot the opin10n
that the dootrine ot Thomas vas on17 a etage in the evolution ot
ph1losophy, albeit a high and unsurpassed ,tage ln the hlstory ot
phllosophy.
tlon.

The, do not denr, but rather expeot turther evolu-

They are 1ncllned to

s~d1

other

phllosophlc~

Iyst.m.,

1n the oplnion that everr human thought aust bave ltl hldden
element ot truth, which should not be despised but valued a8 a
vestlge ot that lnetfable Truth from whlch lt st....

TheT stand

tor, as G. B. Phelan saY8 ot Marltain, "a llvlng, not an arohaeolog1cal Tho.lsa.,l

1937, 31.

1 G. B. Phelan, Jaoque, !arltaln, Hew York,
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There certainll ls place in Thoal.a tor a sound tradi-

..,

tion; on most tundamental problems Thomas gave the answer once
and tor all; and deviating trom him, we mlght easl1, dritt aW&7
In that endless stream ot subJeotive error whlch modern phllosophl otten seems to be to one who studles lt tro. the Itandpolnt ot a Christian.

On the other hand lt would be .trange,

to sal the least, it Thomaa were the ultlmate phase ln the
evolutlon ot human thought, lt philosOph1 had reaohed in hi. It.
tinal pertectlon and were susceptible ot no turther development.
st. Thomas hlmselt certalnly was not ot thls oplnlon.
philosophy vas the aearch ot mankind tor truth.

For hlm

But as truth

tinalll colnoldes with the Dlvlne aelng, there ls no 11mlt to
the development ot philosophy.

Man will forever dlscover new

treasures in the hldden mines ot being.
St. Thoaas'. reverence tor

t~th

made hl. Investigate

the slstems ot pagan phl10sophers, and no man ever looked more
palnstakingl, for the leaat partlcle ot truth In thelr writlng ••
Had he wrltten 1n our tt.e we would tlnd quotat10n. tram the
works ot Kant, Bergson and Jail •• as we flnd thea nov troa
Averroe., Avloenna and Malaonldes, and even trom a charlatan
11ke Davld of Dlnan' whoa he call. 'aost .111,8.

Trl1ng to

enrlch Thomaa t • philosophl wlth the dlscoverle. ot .odem

--

phl1osophers la, theretore, undoubtedly ad .ent .. -~.-dlvl Tho.ae,
wholly in accord wlth hls lntentlon.
of the Popes trom Leo XIII's Aeterni

fhl1 ls also the teaching
~!r18

to Pius XIlt, Huaanl

Generl., who, though he varns Oathollcs agatnst the grave errors

- 3 -

ot modern

alao 1.,8: 'we a&1 e.rlCh our phl10soph,
wlth the fruits ot the progress ot the husaa mlnd ll • The Pope
p~11osophl,

1s no advocate ot narrow-mlnded tradltionall ...
A strlklns exaaple ot the 41tterent attltude. toward
modern phllosoph, 1n !hoat... ot the 8'ruggle between OOft.erTatl .. and progresslvlaa. can be tound.. 1ft the probl_ whloh 18

.

Row tar can Thoal .. go 1ft Ita

the 8ubJect ot thls the.la.
adaptatIon to aodern a78t ...?

There 18, I thInk, no aore

convlnolng argument to ahow that Thoat .. Is a llvlng phllosoph,
and not a dry tOBsll whose place 18 ln a aus ... , than the
h18tor7 of thoalstl0 aplate.ologl.

Thls hiatory ahowl bow

Tho.ls. Is stl11 able to selze a modern probl .. , an4, with the
use ot Its agelesa prlnoiples to solve 1t and lnoorporate 1t In
Itselt-- not In the va, ot eoleotl01" but aaklDg It Into a
homogeneous adaptatloR.
When fhomlam awoke ln the 19th century, atter a long
perlod ot letbarl1, lt tound Itselt contronted wlth manT
entlrely new problems, the lIost iaportaftt of vhloh oertainll vas
the problem ot knowledge.

ror aan, ceat.r1e. aall had u.84 hl1

Intellectual raoul', wlthout e.er asklng himself vhether the
knowledge It gave hl. aocuratel, represented reallty ex1stlng
0.t814. himselt.

He had alva,s taken lt for granted that real

th1ngs exlste4 outslde hlmself and that his lntellect gave

h~

1 Plus XII, ljwaaJIl Gener18, lev 'fork, 1950, 16.

rellable lntoraatlon about them.

Phl1osophers had asked them-

selvea whether the lnt.lleot was a suitable instruaent to lead
to truth.

Thls was the 80-oalled soeptioal problem, whlch was

alIIost aa old as human speoulatlon.

But man had never aeked

himselr whether the lntellect reaohed reallty outside his mlnd,
extramental r.ality.

He had never doubted that.

.

The questlon

had never been ral.ed and, theretore, had never been the obJeot
ot solentltlc lnvestlgatlon.

Though reallsm was at the basls

or all phl1osophlcal lnqulrles up to the Renaissanoe, lt bad
never been sclentlfloally proved and ls, therefore, oalled
Inalve rea11 .. ••

Van Steenberghen says that Thoaa.·s reali ..

cannot be called "popular reall.' (hi. equlvalent of nalve
reallsa) because 'the dootrlne 'or abstractlon and the dootrlne
ot Jude-ent, the dootrlne or reflexlon and tbe theory or truth,

the orltlo1sm or the tlrst prlnolples and the unlversals, the
doctrlne or qulddltles and all the Thomlstlc 10g10, are not
merel, doctrines of oommon ••ns .... l
This 18 certalnly true; the above .entloned doctrlne.
are no dootrlnes ot oommon sense but the results ot protQund
philosophlcal speoulatlons.

However,-- and thls Van

Steenberghen s ... s to torget-- ths, are all ln the tleld of
ps,chologr and 10g10 and not ln the tleld ot epistemology
strlotl, sp.aklng.

1949, 58.

lowh.re ln the works ot St. Thomas v111 you
1 ,. Van St ••nberghen, 121at••ologz, II .... York,

- (;

"

tl1l4 an .xp,.,l tlon of the 14.all.,tlc proD.l .. , whether and In
what degree the Iftt.lleot reaohes extramental reallt" what
Is the value ot Intelleotual knowledge.

St. thomal, 11k. all

phIlosophers ot hls age, took realism tor granted.

Th.retore,

his must also be called nalve or popular reall •• , 1.e., no'
solentltloal11 JustIfIed.

.

At the beglnnlng ot Iledern t1l1•• , hovever, Descart.s
stated the prlnclple. troa vhloh Ideall .. aro.e.

Dl.appointe4

with the poor re.ults ot late-soholastlo Ipeculatlon he lett
the path ot soholastl0 ••tbod In .earoh tor ...ethod whioh
would glve hla aore satlstactory result..

aethod ot aatheaatloa.

He round It 1n the

fhl ••• thod va. bound to loosen the

relatIon betweeA thoughtand realit, and was,ther.tore, the
tirst step to 14eall&8.

Though D.scartes hlaselt alva,.

r_alAed a reall.t, hi. use ot the _theaatlel .,thod and the
doctrln.s It led hi. to JU8t11 earned tor him the naae -'ather
ot Id.all .. ••

'or .xample, he was a ••dletlst, t.aohlng that

the mlnd knows dir.ct17 onl1 Ita Ideas.
A new probl.. had b.e. oreated, th,14eal1st10.
probl_, the pro'bla ot the value of h_an knowledge,
became

80

1aportant

~t

It soon

1t vas eonslA.red the aaJor. aad In

many ca8.S the anlr pl'Obl. at ph110sophioal 'Peculat1oa.

'or

manr modern systems the solution ot th1. problea .eans also the
end ot the1r phl10soph7.
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Ille revlver. ot !boJllam 1n the 19th centurT understood that a yery lmportant part ot thelr task would be to
glve a satlstaotory solutlon ot thla probl...

The, regarded

the problem aa a real one and trled to giV. lt & .olutlon.
Whereas the solutlons glyel' to It D1 modem philosopher.....r.
all Ideallstlo, modern echolaetlca und.rstood that aa 14eallstlo
solution vould ••an d.ath tor Thoa1...

Th., vere contldent

that Tholllstlo prlnclpl•• would lead th_ to a real1st1.
solutIon.
ror the •• thod to be uee4 In tbiB lnvestlgation they
looked toward modern philosophers.

There the, to\U'l4 that the

method general17 used .lno. the '1.. ot Kant waa the •• thod ot
cr1t10al lnvestlgatlon.

Kan,. 'fholllats ,pled to oo.e t. a

solutlon b, uelaa th1e •• thod ot a cr1t1cal lnv •• tlgatlon (tor
this reason call1ng thelr In.estlgatlons Critioa), and

a&ft,

also used another •• thod ot modern philosoph1, vls. »esoartes·
methodloal doubt.
The vhole developaeat ot Thomlstlc epletemolog1 Ihowl
that it 18 verT ••oh indebted to modern 87st.... both 1n regard
the accepting ot the quest10n and the methods leadlng to
lts solution.

Reaotion to the idealistic 'endenoiee ot earl1

neo-soholast10 solutions to the eplsteaologloal problem was
bound to co.e.

Alread In 1929 i. de Tonquedeo wrote:

-the theory whloh make. aethodloal doubt the tlrst
stage ot orlt1oal philosoph, 18 a badl, dlge.ted
theor" unrealistic and full ot superticlal vlewpolnts: the PSTchologloal data are analysed ln It

- 7 -

1n an lnexact wal. d1stor\d an4 presented 1n a
talse~llght- whlch ls on the whole the 11ght ot
modern ldea11ca. 81

Betore him Charles Borer had alrsadf or1tl01sed the
same thlng.

His oplnion was that eo•• !homlsta bad gone too

far 11'1 tbelr adaptation to modera ldeall...
or1tloal proble. 1s a delloate one.

And 1I14ae' the

7.0 large oonoesslons

'0

1dealism may make lt Insolwble:

Koreover 1t 1s a problem with tar-reaoh1ng ph1losoph10 oonsequences, which demands aore than the usual prudenoe.
Some or1t1cs thought that apologetio conslderatlons had made

several Tholllsts lose s1ght

or

this prudel'1o..

The,. wute4 to

refute ldeallam tram the standpolnt ot the 14ea11st hlas.lf,
forgetting Gllson'. warn1ng that once you start as

aft

1deallst,

you are condemned to r ..a1n an ldeal1st torever.

Thes. or1t101_s, however, were 411"80ted onll agalnst
1ndlv1dual polnts ot neo-scholast1o aplateaolog)'. But ln 1936,
1n a 11 ttl. book !:t! ft!!!.lsae •• thodlque 2 Et1enn. GUIOD or1 tlelsed the eplat_ologloal .e'hod used bl Tholllsts up to bi.
tl•• , 1 ••• , the •• 'bod ot crltlcal real1...

As lts ohlet

representatlve. Gl110D took Xercler and loll; but h1s oriticl... we1"e not restrloted to speclflc 'eaohlng. ot LouTaln.

A:.J.

Par1s, 1929, p. 4"It"
Parls, 19M.

4e 'fonqu.edec,

Orltlg~,!t ~

!! Connal.sanee,

2 Itlanne Gl1s0A, L. R'!118•.~ .tthodlg..... e.

- 8 -

Gilson's critics pOinted out that hls blanket oondemnatlon ot
<II

crl tical reall_ was supported onlY' br arguaents agalnst the
critlcal reall.- of the Louvain school, chlet11 that ot Mercier
and loel. l
Moreover the, were anxlous to hear how he would
defend realism lt not br .eans ot a crltlque.

Theretore, he

wrote a .econd book ln whloh h. trled to show that hi,
critiolam. not onlY' struok .ercler and Joel but all Thomlsts
who held crltlcal reall_.

ae

expanded the 11s' to Include

all outstandlng fhoalsta ln eplstemologY' and also trled to
prove that wlthout a crltlque he could stl11 hold a phl1osophlcallY' Justlfled reallsm.

Thls •• cond book waa atallsme

Thomlste !! Crltlgue !! l! Connal.sance.
In the pretace to hls .econd book he sars that he bas
been shooked bY' the expressions ot Thomlstl, Itor whoa the
notlon of evidence ,eeas to have loat all value, and that ot
human knowledge all slgnlflcatlon-, and he presents his

book

a8 "a crltical anal,sls of carte.lano-thoa1 .. and kantlanothoalss·.

Among the Thoalst, tor whoa the notlon ot human

knowledge 8eems to have lost all slgnltlcance, we are astonished
to find Noel, Rolland-Golsel1n, Marachal, Jollvet, Karltaln,
qulte a gallerY' of promlnent sod ern Thoalsts.
1

Se proalses to

Etlenne Gl1son, Reallam. Thomlsts !! Crltlgue

!! !! Connalssanos, 'arls, lOSe, p. 5.

- 9 -

cr1tlclse

w~at

he oalls the 'debauches ot phl1osoph1cal

ooncordl .. ••
Even betore taklng note ot Gilson'. orltlol ••• ln
detall, ever1bod7 wl11 agree that the.e are expression. t;plcal

ot conservatlsm.

According to R. Verneau. in a studT ot

Gl1son's eplste.ologr, ln connectlon with thls book, Thomi ..
such as Gl1son protesses must be calle4 wlth a word ot Harltaln
'antlmodem,.l

"Thoalsts who put the orltloal questlon are

lpso facto dlaloyal to Salnt Thoa.s,.2
Fr. L. Regls, who shares the vlews of Gilson, puts
h1s 1ndlgnatlon in a beautlful metaphor sa,lng that 'Thoalea
has b.en pulled for too long by an lde.11stl0 tug-boat , • 3
Fr. Smlth, a180 a staunch defender ot Gl1son t s vlews, oalls hi.
books enthuslastloall, a 'date ln the hlstor, ot eplatemolog,',
d1viding eplstemology into two perlod. 'ante G1lson and post
Gilson D • 4
What makes thls dlscusslon so extremelf lnterestlng
is that we witness a struggle between the two wings ln Tboal .. ,
Traditlonallsm and Progresslvl •• , a struggle ln which the most

1

Etlenne Gl1son PbllosoRhe de la Ohretlent.,
-- --

2

~,

Parls, 1949, p. 217.

p. 215.

3 L. X. Reg 1 a ,
Milwaukee, 1946, p. 8.
1943, p. 248

4 G. Smlth,

~alnt

fbgmas and Epl.temo1ogl,

!a! Xaritaln

Voluae or !he Thomlst,

- 10 out.tanding~Tho.lsts

ot our da,s are lnvolved.

Horeover, the

subJect of the quest10n ls not a phllosoph1cal probl.. ot
m1nor importance, but the question around whioh the whole
phllosoph1 ot modern t!Bes pivots.

I lntend, atter an

expositlon ot G1lson'. critlc1 ... to subJeot them to a orltical
examination and tlnalll to say a word on his posltlve teaohlngs
on eplstemologr.

- 11 CHAP!KR I.

GILSOH'S ORITICISM

or

CRITIOAL REALISM.

In order to obtaln a aore obJeotlve vlew ot Gllson's
thought about crltlcal r.all .. a tirst chapter wl11 b. d.voted
to an ,xposltlon ot hls crltlo1s•• contaln.d ln the two books
wlthout crltlcal remarks.

In thls var hi. oplnlon wll1 be

shown to better advantag., wlthout obJ.ct10ns block1ng the
..ooth tlow ot hls thought.
The teach1ng or the two books wl11 be .xplalned
,eparat.ly, slnoe there ls a certaln progress ln hls crlticl ..
/
ot crltlal r.alism. Van Rle' polnts out ln LtEplstemologle
Thomlstel that three perlods oan be dl.tlngulshed ln G11son'.

eplstemology.

Th.re i. a slow .volutlon troll 1927 to 1942,

trom what Gllson calls pure methodloal r.allsm to a philo.ophically round.d and derended attltud. in his late.t edltion ot

.L! fho.l.... In b! Reallsme Mithodlque and Reall ... Thoml.te
we have two stage. ot thl. evolutlon a8 vell In his arguments
agalnst orltlcal reall •• as ln hls own epistemological dootr1ne.
A. I.E REALISMI METHODIQUE.

In thl. tir.t book Gilson's orltio1 .. ot the posltlon
ot hls opponent. 18 less apodlct1oal.

He s.ys that 'the way ot

eXplalnlng Tholl18l1, he (Noel) otters u.• , i. hard to reoonolle
/'

Louvaln, 1946, 496.

1 Van Rlet, &tEplsteaoAogle Thomlste,

- 12 wl'h 'the splrl't ot fhoat .. • 1 bu~ allo that Noel perhapl use.
"I

tbe word ·orltlque- ln another lenle than he (Gl1.oat and that,
theretore, 've are not 10 tar troa e..eb other al lIa, 1 •••• 2 .
What he denounoe. are oonoel.lons mad. to ideall ..

b,

Thomlltl, and the word 'orltloal real1 .. - tlnd. no tavor in hl.
fo look tor a or1tloal reall .. 1. to look tor a contra3
dlotion; lt 1. 11ke •••klng a .quare C1rol. • Se even .a7.
e1e..

that a realistlc orltlque ot knowledge ls worle than a Iquare
olrele.

4

'lbe thesls ot thls book 11.7 well b. thul expresled:
modern ph110.oph1 and !boal .. are irreconcllable; 14e.llst10
elementl mUlt be kept

ou~

ot Thoal .. , becau.e

~.7

wl11 proye

tatal to It.
Eminent hlstorlan, G1llon out11nes ln a tew page.
modern philosoph, with the roles played in lt b7 De80arte. and
lant, neatly polntlng out the essence ot thelr s1st ... and how
a

tundamental error necessarll, brought thea to 1 t.

Soh01a8tlc~ ..

Settlng

againlt modern pb11o.ppbJ, he show8 how the, are
1 Gilson, L! Realls•• !e\bo41gue, 43.
2 ib1d, 27.
3

1b14, 10.

4 1b1d, 83.

as

dltteren~

- 13 as two world. and how

the~e

1. an unbrldgable gap

between them.
IEvery oomproal.e wlth Ideallsa,· he oonolu4 •• , 'has
to be avo'14.4,1.

Conce.slons ma4. to Ideall .. IIU.t prove fatal

to ThOlll.tlo reall.lI.

IKe who starts as
1deallst l2 •

all

Over and over he repeats a. a wa",lns:
Idealls' I. bound to end up as an

There 1. no pa.saSe possible trom the world ot

Ideallsa to realls••

In modern hlstory the tlgure ot lant stand. .e a
warnlng.

His attltude ot orlt101 .. torbade bta to e.tabllah a

world ot realit,.

ae saw

.,.er, olearly that

onoe tilt orltique

ot knowledge was hls pOlnt ot departure he would ne.,.er be able
to assert an,thlng about realit,.

His sound reason, howe.,.er,

told him that thl. was an impossible polnt ot .,.lew.

!heretore,

he resorted to postulates and gave his phl10soph7 titls teatur.
ot dlsorepano" atflrmlng and de.y1ns reallt, at the .... tta••
Idealls& and reall.a do not

tON aft 8IIalg...

Yet thls 1. Just what .e •• e happen In modera Tholll ...
The.e phl10sophers take aa tb.lr point ot departure the orltique

ot Ideallsm.

The, tr1 to estab11sh the .,.alue ot 1ntelleotual

knowledge by a orltlque as lant 414.
1

Ibld, p. 86.

2

!B!!,

This crlt10lsm 18 nothing

p. ., 10, 48,

sa,

etc.

- 14 -

else but a (ora ot ldeallsm.

Therefore, lt oan never lead to

reall .. even though these phl1010phers olalm that 1t doe ••
s

The reason wb, lt oannot 11 that orltique luppoes that reall88
has not yet been establlshed.

It lt were establlshed there

would be no reason tor crltlque.

Sut lt the tlrst act ot the

lntellect 1. not about reallty, no lubsequent aot can lead to
reallty.
the whole questlon depends on ·what 1s the meanlng

ot the word ·orltlque'.
same sense as Ideallsts
that lt must be.

Is 1t belng used
US8

1t?

b, !homlsts ln the

Gilson lays that lt ls, and

He dlstlngulshes three posslble meanlnge ot

the word 'orltlque ot knowledge- as he say. ln

~

Reallsme

1
Method19ue •

Crltlque ot knowledge oan .ean a retlexlve analysls
to show the role ot subJeot and obJeot ln the aot at knowledge.
Or 1t oan mean a or1tlque ot dltterent klnd. ot knowledge
(1ntelleotual and lenslble) to deolde whloh are the marks ot
truth and talsenesl.

Gl110n doe. not have any obJeotlon

agalnst these two klnds ot or1tlque, because thelr polnt ot
departure ls reall...

Onoe we alread1 have establlshed that

our lntelleot oan reaoh real1t1, we start exam1ning 1n what
degree 1t oan and what are the oondlt10nl.

1

~bld,

p. 85.

- 15 ~ere

11 a thlrd k1nd ot cr1t1que of knowledge,

however, which OOftllltl in sabaltt1ng the lntelleot to aft
examinat10n in order to lnve.tigate whether 1t CaD attain

real1t, or not.
lcal realist.l.

fhil 1s the kind

ot crit1que used b1 the or1t-

In order that 1t be a reall, orlt1oal lnvestlga-

tlon one has tirst to abstain trom reali...

a priori exaaination, as Gllson sa,8.

It must be

AD

But, theretore, one has

to abandon reall.- and adopt ldeallsa.
There ls no esoape, however, trom ldeali...

The

critical approaoh mlght poss1bly lead to medlate realls.,
whlch must ultimatel, ooae to ldeallea allo, but oertalnl, not

to immedlate reallsm a. Roel wants.
one ot these conoes810ns to ldeallsa.

Kedlate reall .. 18 It ••lt
Thomlats ot the earl1

nec-Ioholaeti0 renalssanoe (aedlate realllts) d1d not s.e that
.

.

there was no wal out ot thelr probl_ but ldeall...
they discovered that the, had gone too tar.

Afterwardl

'oday med1ate

re.lisa has no adherents among fhomlsts.
On the other band Gileon explalns: -'rom tbe ao.ent
one admlts lamed1ate rea11aa, 1t ls imposs1ble by det1nltlon to
4eaonatrate or prove the existenoe ot the exterlor world. dl
1...d1at. reall .. excludel orltlcal reallsm.

It Hoel 18 an

lamed1ate reallst, he must be such ftotwlthstandlng hl. orltical
polnt ot departure.
1

-1b1d, p.

40.
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'r()l!put the whole question 1n a tew word.a, G1lson's
argumentation amounts to this:

It realism has to be proved,

at what point ot departure can one begin?

It one begins wlth

a rea11stio point ot view, then no real proof 11 possible.
It one begin. w1th an 1deal1stic po1nt or v1ew, realism oannot

be proved.

There 1. no escape !rom ldeall ...
A

leoond obJectlon i. oonneoted w1th this.

An unbias-

ed or1tieal examination ot huaan knowledge, ln whloh reall .. 1.

not to be 8uppo8ed, make. eplstemology the tirst ot ph1losophical 8elences.

Metaphysics treats about belng.

But 1t 1s

olear that the question whether we oan know be1ng has to be
estab11shed betore .e start workin. on be1ng.
But, aa Gl1son eays, lt oannot be proved.

AArone who

1nsiats on its proot aust .Deoe.8arily be led to 1dea11sm, wh10h
destroys metaphysics.

Theretore, ·we see no other alternat1ve

today, exoept to renounoe metaphysics or to ret.ra to a precrlt10al reall."l.
Be givee this adv1ce to Thomlsts: ·what ODe has to do
ls, to liberate one.elt trom the obse.slon ot eplstemolog1 as
• prellmlnary conditlon '0 phll0S0phY'S.
Orltloal rea11sm glves !hoalea thls aab1suou.
att1tude, lt uses an ldeal18tl0 method to reach a reallst10 loaL

1

2

p. 15.
-lb1d,
lbid. p. 1 ••

-
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Neither ldeal.sts nor realists f1nd this satisfactory.

Noel

for instance use. Descartes' doubt and establishes immediate
realism by means of It.

Se really never leaves realit,.

Ideallsts will say that he did not understand Desoartes, or it
he did, he seems to be dishonest.

It seems as it he pretends

to use an ldealistio method, ln order to bring ldealists baok

.

to realism, whereas he really does not use It.
On the other side neither does it satisty Tho.ist.
because they feel thl. brlnglng of ideallstic elements lnto
Thomism as belng unfaithful toward St. Thoaa..

Oritical

realism ls, therefore, ·one of the aost I.rlous obstacles to
the full flourlsh of a !"snewed real1811l 1l • l
In the last ohapter, whloh 18 oalled 'Advioe for a
beglnning realist', h' says that a modern man ma, find it very
hard not to be allowed a orltlcal attitude, but that 'the
reallst has to submit oneself to it tor the orit1oal Ipirlt
is the very point of 148&11 .... 2
B.

REALISME '1'HOMIS'1'); 1:'1' CRITIQUE DI LA COINAISSANOE.

Because of the many reactlons

L!

Reallsme Methodlgue

eVOked, Gilson felt compelled to explaln h1.selt .oreclearl,.
Although his crltic1sms ln

~

aeallsm, Hethodlgue were directed

Ohiefly against Merc1er and loel, other fhomlsts, call1ng

1

~,

p. 84.

2

.ill!.

p. 98.
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themselves crltlcal reallsts, saw thelr syste. threatened by
h1s attacks. l Moreover there was a general curlos1ty about
<It

how Gllson was golng to bulld up an eplste.ology lt not b, way
at a crlt1cal 1nvestlgat10n.

Theretore, he wrote thls new book,

as he explalns 1n lts pretace.
The t1rst slx ohapters are 4..ot.4 to crltic1sms ot

.

varlous Thomlsts, 1n the last two he glr •• a poslt1ve exposltlon ot hls ep1stemology.

It ls not the purpose ot thls thesls

to tollow hls crltlcl" ln deta1l.

We are not so muoh pre-

occup1ed wltb answerlng partlcular crlt101 .. s as w1th detendlng
ln general the lawrulness ot uslng the crltloal el .. ent ln a
Thomlstlc eplstemolog,.

Horeover hls cr1tlcls. ot tbe d1tterent

s1ste.s always amounts to the saae oharge, ot us1ng orlt1que 1n
establ1sh1ng the value ot 1ntellectual knowledge and thereby
devlat1ng Thoalsm tro. lta rea11st1c poslt1on 1nto ldeall ...
In th1s book h1s crltlcls. 18 .uoh more developed and explalned
ln a clearer and lIore oonvlnclng way.
Hls crit101s.s oan be summed up 1n two thesls:
(1)

The orlt1cal .ethod used by Thoalsts to establlsh

the value at lntellectual knowledge aust lead to ld.all .. ; or,
1 To speak or crltloal real1sm as Ithe doctrlne
ot the Louva1n School' ls certalnl, not correct. Jollvet calls
orltloal realls. ·co.mon 1n Thoml .. ' Jollvet, &e Thomlsme et la
t1gU f! !! l!: ....nals.anc., Parlel933, p. 29. dIlson oppen=ens ln Le Rialisme R.thodI~ue were m&1nl, Xercler and Nail, but
ln Realiai. ,60.18t. the, are tor the aOlt part not trom Louvaln.

1rt

/

-19it it does n2t, it is useless, because then it doe8 not establish an,.th1ng.
This crit10al aethod makes •• taph781c8 dependent

(2)

on eplatemology and thereby destroys its unoondltlonal primac7.

GILSON'S FIRST

TH~SIS

As we have stated th1s tirat thesls, it 1s given 1n
.l
almost the exact words ot Gileon.
We shall atteapt to
reproduce here hls explanatlon and detense of the position
represented by this thesls.
What do Tholl1sts meaD when the,. speak ot ·critical
real1 ..,-

H1storioally the tera is ua.a 1n contrad1stinction

to a 80-oalled na1ve realism, a rea11 .. based on coaaon .ense.
This 1s the real1 .. ot the noa-ph11osopher. ot the man on the
etreet.

It 1. not 801entlflcal11 Ju.tltle4.

Though thl.

reall_ ls pertectl,. all r1ght, ln order to be u.etul as a
~asls

tor ph11osophloal speculatlon 1t

establ1shed.

IIU8t

be phl1osophlcall,.

fhl. 1s done br way ot a refl.z1on.

Gl1lon agrees with all thie.
phllosophlcal.
has to be used.

.alve reall .. i8 non-

In order to make it phllosophical, reflezion
'fhis makes 1t a re.11sm which 1s conscious of

1t8 reasofts and whlch, theretore, laoka the spontaneous

tootnote.
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oertitud. ot~common sense.l But does this make lt a critical
reali ..,

It sakes lt onl1 a reflexlve or phllosophlcal

reall...

Otherwlse the whole philosoph, a.7 b. oalled

critioal. 1
The word ·crltloal U , theretore, 1s ent1rel, superfluous; lt has no ••anlng_

The reall .. or ever1 philosopher

aust be a phllosophioal or reflexlve rea11sm, bvt that 18 not
suffiolent reason tor oalilng lt a orltloal r.ali...

The word

·oritioal- 1s not on11 superfluous but a180 oonfuslng.

It was

flrst used by lant, who gave lt a apeolal ••aning lntlaatell
connected wl th h1. 14eall_.

The lantlan u.e ot the 'era

ralses serlous objections agalnst a fhomlstl0 use ot the

WO~.

It lt means An,thing more than reflexive or ph1losoph1oal
reall .. , lt must aean loaethlng ln a Xantlan or 14ea11stl0
••nse and, theretore, gravel, oollprOflis •• Tholllsta who

1&S8

It.

Among the most olear-sighted cr1t1cal realista, Gllson
t1ndl the work cr1tlque u.ed 1ft the sen.8 ot refleilon onll,
wlthout anT other ••anlng; and he quotes •• an ....pl. a
tence ot K.gr. L. Noel. 3 Karl taln too 18 plaoed 1n th1s

SeD-

oategorl, although tb. latter verr olearlf dist1nguish.s b.tween
tritique and a ph110sophy, and detlnltell vlndicates the notlon

-

2

1bld, p_
-lbld,
p.

3

lb14, p. 37.

1

39
38
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ot critlcal reall ... 1
41

Other fhoalsts however, accordlng to Gl1son, glve
the word crltlque a meanlng dltterent trom retlexlon.

The,

want to st.te so•• thlng more than that thls reall .. 18 brought
troa a common sense to a phllolophioal Itage b, a retlexlon
their oplnlon thil rftJ..xlon doel sOlIe thl ng

only.

Accordlng

.0•••

In that ca.se the, aust take the word critlq.ue ln the

~o

.

sense glven to it b7 lant. who tlrst uled It.
to ralse the so-aalled crltlcal problem.

He was the tlrl

Moreover the oritloa

proble. vas lntroduced lnto !boala. ln order to give an answer
to lan" s ldealla.

But ln order to answer lant fhalsts aust

start trom the SaDle proble..

fhls was lndeed the blg probl..

ot the ear11er I.o-Soholastlcs; how to aRsw.r the ldeallst8.
The1r dogaatl0 realls. dld not oontain a lat18t,lng answer to
the ldeallstl0 pos1tlon.

So the, trled to tlnd an answer to

'ant trom Xant's ovn vlewpolnt.
crit1cal rea1188.

fhls vas the be.lnnlng ot

Gilson doubts whether thl. va. ave., wls.

aove tor !hoal ••.

1. On 'aocount ot the deferenoe w1 th lIhlch (U180n
treats Kar1ta1n, whom he mentloDs onl, ln a tootaote, although
Harltaln 1s also a critioal rea1!st, Ksgr. Joel makes the
naught1 remark: X. Gilson tralt. M. Marltal. aV80 beauooup;Lus
de menagement que 1& colleotion de soutane. - blanohes, nolres
vl01ettes ou meme roug¥es (o~Tlous11 reterrlng to Ro1lan4Gossel1n O.P., the Jesu1t and .eoular prlests, Magr. Noel and
C~rdlnal Meroler)- quIll bou80ule aveo entraln a tous les coln
Ou 11 lee trouv.L. Noel, ~ ReallSM. Immedlat, p. 61
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A brlet historical survey ot how lant oame to his
<II

problem and how he lolved 1t, may help to understand the posltlon ot Thomistio reali ... l
Kant tr1ed to f1nd the reason tor the wonderful
progress ot the sclenoea he d1100vered and on the other hand the
deoa1 ot philosoph,.

That reason, he thought, was that philos-

oph1 ueed the wrong .ethod.

Theretore he trled to glve

philosoph, a better •• thod.

He dlstingulshes between alalrt1cal

and synthetlcal .. a prlori and a posterlor1 Judgments.

He tound

that .rnthetical a pr10ri Judgments are the only ones wh1ch
augment our knowledge and at the same tls. have sclentltl0 value
An ..,tlcal Judgments have no value be'ause the, do not add anythlng new to our knowledge.

B1 analysis we oan onll see what

the Judgment already contained.

NothIng new is found.

Synthet-

ical a poster10rl Judgments are usele.s for sclenoe also, beoaua
they never lead to generall, valuable knowledge.

Tbe only tblng

they glve us are ooncrete tacts; they oannot glve us laws wh10h
we need tor sclenoe.

The pOBsIbl1it, ot phllosophy theretore

depends on the synthetlcal a prlorl Judgments.

With th1. knowl-

edge Kant instltute. a crltique 1n order to tind out whether
there are ln the intellect prlnc1ple. which torm these .ynthetic 1
a prlorl Judgmenta, what prlnolples they are, and how they
operate.

-

This Is b1s cr1tique ot pure reason.
1. i.Gllson, Reallsme Thomlste p. 162
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fhls orltlque 18 an a priori examination prlor to any
~

senslble experlenoe.

It has to bet because. If lt were not, It

would not be a orltlque or Judgaent of pure reason.

Something

else outslde the aotlvlt1 ot the Intelleot would be lnvolved.
No a posteriori elements ma1 beoo.e Involved beoause that would
bring In senslble knowledge, whlch would lead the philosopher
outalde solentltlc metaphyslcs.
18 essentlal.

For lant thls a prlorl element

Be has to Itart trom the pure Intelleot prior to

any sense actlvlty.

Evident11 such crltlque can never end wlth reallsm.
It purposely excluded realla. at Its polnt ot
tore It Thomlsts take the same attitude

a8

depar~ure.

There-

(ant's they have to

start from Ideall .. also, but that w111 prevent them trom ever
reachlng realism agaln.

It 1s olear that no Thomlst can hold

this.
But although they do not bold thls, they must hold
lomething slmilar In order that their or1tlque really r ..$1ns a
,f,ltlque and does not beoome Just a word wlthout an1 partlcular
meanlng.

What lilt then that Thomlsts talk about when they

ule th1s word ·orltlque"?

They cannot take 1t ln exaotly the

lAZe sense lant understood 1t, because that would toroe them to
beoome Kantlana all the way through. . Xet thel cannot take 1t i.
an altogether d1tterent meaning elther.
orltlque, a Judgment_

It has to remain a

!herefore it 1s necessary that the stand

po1nt from whlch the Judgment takes place Is not the same as It

- 24

~

conolusion, because otherwIse no real Judgment would be posslble
41

There must be a certain stage of suspension tirst, In which a
decislon has not let been taken.
necessary.

A

certain .·pttori element i.

Without It there 1s no crItIque In the real sense of

the word.
Critioal reall •• cannot start wIth reallsm.

It It dId

lant would Justly prote.t and gay: "This 1s no real cr1t1que.
The case has already been deoided betore the beg1nn1ng ot the
Judgmen t.

It

...
We arr1ve at the same dIlemma as In Le Reallsme
M~thodigue.

---- ...

When one takes rea11sm as one's polnt ot departure,

there is no real critlque, no unbiased Judgment; and when one
takes a standpoint outside or pr10r to realism, it must be an
14'a11&tio standpoint and one never will arrive at realism
again.

When cr1tioal reali.',s, assert that the atflrmatioDa ot

realism reoelve a new and tirmer certitude after the or1tique,
G11son asks whether th1. oert1tude was not lutfioient betore the
oritical retlexion.

It 1t was not, the critioal retlex10n oannot

make it more eVident, beoause it on17 makes more olear what was

already there 1n the or1g1nal aot ot the intelleot.

Anl lack ot

evidence 1n the aot ot the intelleot must atteot also the retlex1on.

For realists there oan be no other point of departu.re

but rea11sm.

Th1s makes a critIque imposs1ble.

The diffioulty becoa.s the greater when we oonsider

that realism here is supposed to be immed1ate rea11sm, i.e., a
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realism whi$h protesses to attaln extramental reallty
ately.

~mmed~

How can an lntellect whioh immedlatel, grasps reallty

ever take a posltion other than real1 .. , the real belng lta
immediate obJeot?

For immediate realis. a critique ot knowledg

1s certainly an imposs1bility, even a oontrad1otion.

The word

1mmed1ate rea11sm excludes critlque •

.

G1lson concludes: MTherefore with all due deference
to lts defendera, I perslst ln think1ng that the problem to tln
a orit1cal reallsm 1s as contradlctary ln UlJelt as the notlon

at a square clrole.- 1
Thus the first thesl. seems to be proved: the orlt10al method used hI Thomlsts to establlsh the value ot lntel-

leotual knowledge must necessarll, lead to ldeal1sm, 1f lt 1s a
real cr1tlque, 1.e., a Judgment ot the intellectual aotlvity.
It 1t is not taken in the sense ot being a real Judgment lt ls
no real crit1que.

In that ease 1t 1s useles., beoause lt does

not prove anythlng, and lt had better be avolded as a oontusing
and

misleading term.
GILSON'S SEOOND THESIS
Gilson'S second obJeotion against oritical realiam ls

that it makes epistemology the tirst science and ln so dolng

destroys the prlmacy ot the phllosophy whloh has being as lts

1. ibid, pia 11

obJeot, metaphys1os.

Indeed most orltloal reallsts

S8Y

that

epistemologt 1s the f1rst s01enoe and has to be treated as an
introduotion to metaphySios.

ot v1ew.

This ls naturtltrom their point

Metaphys1cs has as 1ts obJeot reality or beIng.

reaohes this realIty through the 1ntellect.

It

But 1s lt not

natural then, that a kInd ot invest1gation precedes to find out
whether th1s Intelleot is really an instrument Bulted to know
reality?
Med1eval phllosophers ~ere never aware that this

question could be raised.

Their problem, the problem ot the

un1versals 1s a problem among realiRts in the modern aense.
Jo11vet writes about th1s: uThe medieval realists Opposed the
nominal1sts 1n a field whioh 1s greatly different trom the one
1n which the probl.- 1s raised toda1~ 1n taot, lt is not the
lame problem whioh is treated; the Middle Ages have been preOooupied for a long time w1th the quest10n ot the nature ot the
conoept. they never doubted that its oontent had been borrowed

~rom the obJeot, and even les8 that the object really ex1sted.- 1
~e1 took 1t tor granted that the obJeot ot the intellect was
.xtramental real1ty.

But onoe the quest10n has been raised

br

~omebod1 1n more modern times, then a large group ot scholast10
ph1losophers belleve
Uletion.

tl~t

they can oonsider 1t ns a legitimate

When lt is a legltima.te question however, has not

1. a.JOllv et.
p. 32 •

Ad Tho.islle .!! .!! cr1tlgu,tt !! !! connalssanoe.
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the solution to be glven betore one proceeds to .etaphyslos?
41

This ls what Xsgr. Noil states ln hls Reallsma

"
!mmedlat:
-There 1s no good .etaphyslcs without critical prolegomena, and lant, and betore hlm Descartes, taught phl1osoph,
once and tor all, somethlng whloh constltutes an essential
progress ot human thought-. l It is very olear where the.e
modern scholastio crltloal realists got their lnsp1ratlon.
For all modern ph1losophlcal s,.te.. the ep1eteaological problem
1s tbe tirst problem to be lolved.
ther.

Several never get any

Should Thomlsta tollow their example?

far-

Is it possible

to tollow thea w1thout renouno1ng St. Thom.s?
G1lson th1nksilt is not.

Hls doctrlne 1s very clear:

-I contest the prlorlty ot epistemology ln regard to prlmac,
phl10soph1 or .etaphyslos, wbl1e Msgr. Noel aftlrms that the
ontologlcal theor, ot knowledge ls 10gloal17 posterior to
eplste.olOg,·.2 Orl tlca~..rea11.a destroys the unoondl tlonal
primacy ot metaphysloS. 3 It is a subverslon ot Thoalaa. 4
The tirst obJeot ot the intellect is beingi the tirst
lel.nce, theretore, must be the solenoe about being as being,
whlch ls .etaphyslos.

1938, p. 23 - 24.

It starts with the oonoept ot belng and

1 L. Noel, L! Reallsme Immediat, Louvain,
"
2 Gl1son,Rea11sme
Thomlste. p. 36 tootnote.
Speclaiiy also p. 106 sq.

3
•

~,p.
~,

106.
p. 108.

- 28 -

tbe tlrst

~lnolples

whlch are nece,sary tor all sclenoe.

No reallstlc pbl10sophy, 1.e., no phllosophy whloh holds that
the tlrst buman knowledge ls the knowledge ot belng, oan
devlate tram It.

Hetaphyslos rurnlshes the base tor all tur-

ther solentltic knowledge and, theretore, Justly oocuples an
unoondltlonal prlmaoy among th•••
At the tlme whloh saw the beglnnlng at modern
phllo.ophles, however, the lntereat shitted trom belng to
knowledge.

The solenoe ot knowledge bec..e more and more

lmportant, but this emphasls obsoured the relatlon between
knowledge and belng gradual11 and paved the wa, tor ldeallsm.
Ketaphyslcs lost lts prlmaoJ among the solenoes, whloh went
to the new scienoe ot knowledge.

aeallsa dlsappeared and

lde.118m took lts plaoe.
!he crltloal reallsts do not see. to be aware that
reall •• lmplies tbat metapb,aloa 1s tbe tirat solenoe.

Puttlng

up another solenoe betore .etaph,81c8 1, to torsake real1sm.
Another notlon oomes betore the notlon at belng, the notlon ot
thought.

Instead at 11n the beglnnlng was

belng~

00lle8 ·In the

beSlnnlng was thought' but-thls lmp11.s abandonlng reall ...
It anythlng, then reall_ ls the herltage ot ,~ and that

11 oertalnl, the reason wh, Gl1son calls orltlcal reallsm an
Overthrow ot St. Thomas.
Bot only ls metaphyslos, the 801ence at belng, the

... t1rlt at

solenoes, lt also has the prl.aoJ ..ong thea.

It 11
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the solenoe Jlt the f1rst prlnciples and the tlrst causes.
All other sc1ences have to use Its concluslons; all depend
on It.
Acoordlng to the orltlcal realllt., hovever,
metaphysios itself becomes d.pendent on epist ••olog,.
te.olog, Judges it.

Epls-

XetaphTslcs onll becomes a legltimate

sclenoe when Its legittaacl haa been proved bl the crItical
exam1nation ot eplsteaolol7.

Iplstemolol7 dec14 •• vhether or

not It Is posslble to have a .etaphyslos.

That aeans that

•• taph,slcs, the queen of sol.nces, bas been dethroned bl
eplst_ology or that reall111 hal b••n abandoned.
Moreover, what klnd ot princlples 18 eplst ••olog,

---

golng to us. In thla examination it not principles ot
metaphysl0.'

B1 ahovlng back aetaph,sics, ho.ever, to a

aeoond place, It bas no r1ght to use thea.

100041 has the

right to use sclentlf10 prlnclples betore thelr so1entlf10
Talue has been eltabllshed.
Thus explal.'led In lapl. and clear t.nas. the oontradictlon ot crltloal real1 .. 11 apparent, 10 apparent In
taot that one can hal'dl1 belleve that Ita adherents do not
•• e It.

They have, however, a oerta1n vague and contused va,

ot eXposlng the1r d.octrlne. about wh1ch Gl1son complalns;
ao~,oTer

the, are conv1nced that there must be a wa, to conquer

14'alla. wlthout supposing the opposlte; as 1t were fro. 1ns1de.

... 30 ...~

To thls la8t charg', that crltlcal reall_ would
41

make metaphyslos subordlnate to eplstemology, crltloal
reallsts have an answer.

They say that the relatlons between

epistemology and metaphysios are mutual.

Eplstemology tlrst

establlshes metaphyslcs as a legitlmate selence, but onoe
estab11shed, metaphyslos beoomes tbe tlrst ot all sclence.
and Jutges thea all, a180 epistemolog, under lt8 aspeot ot
treatlng abOut being.

'nowledge oert81nl, talls under the

laws ot belng, but the tirst examlnatlon ot knowledge must be
1nstltuted trom a standpolnt whlcb ae Bolland Gosselln say.,
'ls outslde every •• taphysloal presuPPositlon·. l
Ultimatel, thls second objection ot G1leon agalnst
orlt10al reall_, that lt destroys the uncondltional prlmaey

ot metaphysics, has the aame ground as h1. tirst.

Thle .econd

thesls can be brought back to the same 41leama .e saw at the

end ot the expos1tlon of the tirst one. 2
It the tlrst prinolple ls belng-- whlch atter all

18 at least posslble--, enl est quod prlao cadlt ln

lntellectu,- every state.ent at once laplles 'he -aff1rmation of belng, and dec1d.s the quest10n ln favor
ot rea11sm. It on the contrary a separate d1sclpllne
can be formed without poslt1ng belng, thought, not
belng, 18 the t1rst princlple. In that case, the questlon 18 decided 1n favor ot 1deal1sm. But 1n e1ther
lnstance, the dec1s10n has alread7 beea a.de.
1

~,

2

lbid, p. 112.

p. 110.
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Gllson reproaches orltlcal reallsts tbat they go
too tar ln adaptlng Thomls. to modern phllosophles.

Whlle

thelr purpose ls to oonform Thomasts perennlal truth to modern
tlmes, the, seem not to reallze that lnstead ot promotlng lt
they rather endanger what lsprlmary ln lt, 1.e., 1ts reallsm.
It ls a slgn that modern thought has been profoundly oontamlnated and corrupted bl lant's'orlt1que, that outstanding
Thomlsts do not see the 1mpllcatlons ot a non-reallstic standpolnt at the entrance ot ph1losoph,.

The endeavours to retute

ldeal1sm by uslng lts own method must oertalnl, be pra1sed.
But the thlng Just can't be done.

It 11 lmposs1ble.

Though

many answers have been g1ven by Thomlsts slnce the beglnn1ng
of neo-scholastlo1sm", none ot them have proved to be satlataetory.

They elther water down thelr crltlque

only seem to use the same

met~od

10

that thel

&s ldeallsts whereas the,

really do not, or they have a real crltlque but beoome
entangled ln many lnsoluble problems.

Crltlcal reall .. mlsses

the clarlty whlch ls a characterlstlc ot Thoml.-, as lt ls a
oharacterlstic ot truth.

Th1s might have led 1ts detenders

to a susplc10n ot 1t8 lawfulnels.
There aust, therefore, be another answer to ldeall_
&Ad another way out ot the probl.. ot knowledge.

Tbese are

Gllson's conclusions ln the negatiT. part ot R'alls•• l.hom1a!e.

-~-

OHAPTER II
AN ESTIMATE OF GILSON'S CRITICISM
If G1lson ls correct 1n his or1t1clsm, modern Thomlea
1s sufter1ng from a serlous malady.

Alaolt the wbole ot lt

would seem to be lnfected wlth the dlsease ot ldeallsm.
that 11 exaotly what Gllson sa,s.
Thomlste, he apeaks of

And

In hls preface to Real1 ...

present.d by some aodern
Thomlats, as belng In 'a state of advanced decompolltlon-. l
fhom1s~'as

Although he applles th1s phrase of the 1ntroduct1on only to
oertaln modern Thomiata,2 the body ot the book makea clear
that lt applles, ln Gilson's thinklng, to the leaders ot
oontemporary fhoml.m.

Crltical reallsm ls, acoordlng to

Jollvet,a the oommon teachlng ot Thomlsta today.

Certalnly.

they use the word 'orltlque- freely, qu1te unaware, 1t would
8eem, of lts dangerous lmpllcatlons.
'they are playing w1th dynam1t.'. 4

As Gl1son puts 1t,

Thom1stlc th1nkers are by no means lntalllble, not
even as a whole.

But lt ls dlttlcult to belleve that they, al

a group, would have tallen into the serlous blunder ot wblob
1

!B!!,

p. 7.

2

~,

p. 7

3 R. Jo11vet, Le Thoml ... et la Orltlque

!! !! Oonna1ssance, Parll, 1933, p. I§.
~

~!!

-- --

• E. Gl1son aeall ..e fhoallte et Critlque
Connallsanoe, p. 67.
--
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Gl1son aoouae. them, and then perslated In the same blunder
41

tor almost 50 years, teachlng It In the1r sohools and developlng 1t 1n their ·orltlques ot knowledge-, whlle all rthe tl.e
none ot them was aware ot the tact that he was undermlnlng
Thoml88 lnstead ot promotlng it.
Is nelther

80

Noreover, Gl1son'. orltlclsm

subtle nor so profound that It could po.albll

have eacaped\olear thlnkera.

He

hlmselt says that It surprises hlm that it dld,

and he thInks the realon Is that fhomlsts were too preoccupIed
wlth defendlng realls. agalnst Ideallsm In a way acoeptable to
Ideall.t8.

Thelr eagerness must have made them lose slght ot

the danger.
The faots are, however, tbat Thomlsts have always
been aware ot the danger ot Idealls..
glea made at least professedl,
Van Rlet's

~tEplstemolosle

~

A study ot eplste.olo-

.ent..

~

Thomae, suoh as

Thoml.te, shows that the, bee...

gradually more purifled of dangeroul elements, whlch they
oertalnly contalned In thelr early stages.
In the flrst stage Thomlst. adapted 'he.selves too
.uch to Idea11stl0 posltlons.

Thel started trom an Ideallst10

POint of departure, or they Invoked the prlnolple ot causallty
l1ke Desoarte.,l to arrIve at reallty.

But the.e were the

tlrst hesItant attempts of a phI1080pn, searchIng tor a solut1on

1

e. gr. Oardinal MercIer, aeinstadler, 'r1ok

- M-

to a new probl
...
41

Eventually, the suspect el •• ents were

ellmlnated, and Thoml88 tound the proper approach to the
eplstemologlcal probl_.

Though all the Thomlstlc eolutlo1l8

to the 'plstemologlcal problem are not identloal, all have
a substant1al unity.

In thelr ma18 polnte, 1.e., thelr

.ethode (crltlcal approach) and concluslon. (1...41at8 reall .. ),

.

m08t Thomlsts today are ln oomplete agr•••• nt.
Properly to ••aluate &11aon's critlclsm, we aust
know exactll what h. und.retands bl 'crltlque'.

Accordlng to

h1s understandlng at the term, 1t cannot be reoonciled wlth

real1811l.

The two worde are not compatible.

reall .. • 1s a oontradlctlon 1n teras.

"Crltioal.

l

But 'orltlque- 18 not .. e&s, word to dttlr.., Glleon
saY8.

2

However, l t lt means anything, it aust mean a

Judgment.

o.rt~n

The gre.k word, lade.d, .ean. Ito Judg., to 4.01de

1n a cau.e, to.dlsoern'.

In eplsteaologr. theretore, 1t must

.ean, to pronounoe a Judgment on the aotlvltl ot the lntelleot
or on human knowledge ln g.neral.

no value

lt

A Judpent, however, has

the Judge ls preJudloed, l t he has alread, deolded

beforehand what he ls golng to 8a,.

All the 'e.tlmonl •• ot

defendants and the pleas ot lawyers are u.eles8 ln tbat oa8e.

1

!! l! Conna1ssanoe,

I. Gl1son, R.,llsme fhoalste J! Crltlgv!

p. 77.

2 !\)14 , P. 41.
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Such a Judgment ls not a Judgment; lt i. onl1 a tarce.
In human knowledge •• have the .ame oa...

Elther we

take a. our polnt ot departure reall .. , but then the orltlque
has already been deolded betorehand &ad la no lIore than a taroe,
or

.e

take a point ot departure prior to reall...

In that o..e

we have a real orltique, but .e wl1l neTer agaln arrlTe at
realiBII.
!he very word orltlque lmplles a point ot d.pariure
other than and prior to its tera.

It the term 18 reall •• , tbe

p01nt ot departure, theretor., aust be an 1deal18tl0 one.

Is thls detinltlon ot crltlque as an a priorl JudgBent
ot the Talue ot human knowledge the onl7 posslble one'

Speak-

lng ot Gilson'. ep18t ..o10g,,1 R. Verneaux polnta out that
there are various other klnds ot oritique, a. lit,rar, orltlque,
muslcal crltiqu., mllltar, crltlque, .to.

In all tbe., oOllblna-

tions the word 'critique- Indioate. a crltloal •• tlaat..

It

does not .ee. to lap1, that a prlori ,lea.nt whl0h Gllaon
atre.ses.

Verneaux wanta, theretore, to a •• the critloal

approach malntalnet.

To thls Gilson oertalnl, would answ.r that 1n thea,
oo.blnatlona the quest10n 1e a qult. 41tterent one.

In the

O.a. ot llterary or1tique, e.g., 1t 11 a18..e4 thai 'bere are

-

1
C
_ht-etlente,
p. 223.

Etlenne .11.oa, Phllosophe !! lA

.----------------------------------------~~-~------------------~
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11terary Vatuel.

These are h1tel'l as a oriter10n or rule to

tind out whether a given work ot literature or
any value ln that tleld and how auoh.

aft

author haa

In the ca.e of a

orltlque ot knowledge, however, no\hlng haa been e.tablishe'
yet.

The questlon is about the .,ery tlrst Judeaent abou'

human knowledge, to t1nd out whether 1t haa any value or not

.

in regard to a pOIs1ble extr..ental world.
nothing oan be presuPpo8e4.

Xn .uch a JUd,..nt

It oertaln11 cannot a.suae the

truth ot a realism whloh 1t 18 asked to e.tabll.h.
Onoe the value ()t hUllan knowledge hal b ••n e.tabll.hed
there 11 rooa tor orit1que to d.terml.e the varlou. degr•• a ot
value ot the 41tterent kind. ot knowledge.
that.

He

SarlH

Gl1aon agre •• wlth

'aeall •• does not retusl a C'rltlqul ot

iDc"ledge!, on the contrary lt accepts lt, 1t aata tor 1t;
but 1t retuee. any .! pr10£1 01"1 tlque ot knowledge _.1 !h1e
01"1 tlque

ot the 41tterent k1ndl of knowledge to de'era.lne

thelr degre.e 'ot value ln atta1n1ng extr...ntal reallt, can
be oOllpared with l1terary, mUl1cal, alUtaPJ orltique.e'o.,
but the t1rst crltlque oertalnl, cannot.
Ifeverthele.. the que.tlon can be asked, whether a
01"1 tlque

ot knowledge, because 1 t must be an lapal'tl&l Judg-

••nt, cannot .tart trom real1_.

-

1

,A Jud,. wbo 1aGoav1noed.

"
E. Gl1.on, Jd Healllme
••..-y!!d1De, p. 81.

r
- 37 -

ot the lnnooeno. or gul1t ot a part, oan atl11 pronounoe a
<II

perteot1, 1.partlal Judgaent.

It all dependa on whether he

lets hls prevlous oonvlctlon play a part ln hls Judga.nt or
not.

It hll d.01810n ls alread, lIade betor.hand, and he la

determlned tQ stlok to lt, whatever evldeno. ma, b. brought
torth bl detendant or law,er, hls 1. oertaln11 not an 1.partlal
Judgment.

.

But a Judge, on the other hand, who, although he

ls oonvlnoed ot the lnnooeno. ot the det.ndant, ls prepared to
11st.n to all the .vldeno. that wl11 be brought torth agalnst
h11l

and to pa.s hls a.ntenoe aooordlng to lt, oannot be

reproaohed tor belng partlal.
The orltlqu. ot knowl.dge se••• to provlde a st.l1ar
oa.e.

Although a Thomlstlc philosopher ls a realist, lt he

dOls not let hl. reall .. lntlueno. hls lnvestlgatlon, but 1.
prepared to aooept the result ot an i.partlal Judgaent, his
.ee•• to be a p.rt.ctly acoeptable orltlque.
Startlng thls lnvestlgatlon he ls a r.a11st, but not
qua philosopher.

Hls ls the rea11 .. ot the common man ln ever,

4&7 11te, whloh 1. oertaln1r not phl10sophloal1, tounded.

It

18 the .... oas. as wlth the Judge, who ls startlng wlth a

ooaplet.17 open mlnd qua Judg..

In the refleotlon It ••1t, the

philosopher as a phl10sopher do.s not -suppose aD7th1ng, not
even r.al1 .... 1

-

P. 64_

H1s lnitlal attitude 11 'outllde the plan ot

1

L. loel. R.vu•• eo,oolastlgu., 1940,

- ae ph1losoph1o,1 researob·. l

Phl1o.oph1call, speakIng it is a

hJpothe.1s tor hla.
All fhoml.ta ,tre.s the Deoel81tr ot thl. lapartlalltl.

Thus Van Steenberghen

8&,S

1n hls Eplste.oloSl:

'Ep1ste.ologr Is an objective and 41al.tere,ted Inqu1rl; It
.tud1e. the nature, oond1tion. and value ot knowledge wlthout

.

deoid1ng betorehand what the re.ult. and consequence. ot 1t.
stud7 vl11 b. I .!
Mons1gnor Noel writ.s in the sam. strain when h.
deflne. the purpose ot tbe orltloal .ethod a.:
'To tr, to glve to ph1losoph, an Inoontestable
polnt ot departure, on the matter ot wh1ch no further
questlon oan be asked; tbe cr1tloal .ethod retuses no
questlon and dlspense. wlth all pre.uppos1tlons.
'Radioal 81noerlt,' 18 neoessarl to oppoae thl.
attItude to the one whloh haa been praet1.ed by 80
manr dogmasllstle slsteas, vhloh aat that there be
forbldden question. and whioh tr1 to iapo.e upon tht
mind the acoeptatlon of lndllputable preJudgaent.·. 3
The orltlcal .ethod dlapen.ea witb all presuppos1tlons", means that 1t starta wlth the taot of hUllan knowledge
wlthout anything else.
t.erybod, agreea.

On the exl.tenoe of buaan knowledge

Inve.tlgatlng this knowledge the or1tlcal

•• thod retuses &Dy 1nterferenoe tro. whataoeYer.
.tart w1th a oertain deflnition of that knowledge.

It doe. not
It neither

a••erta that It exolude. real1tl (the Ideall1t10 pOlltion)

-

1

• 134.

p. 41.

Van Steenbergh,n, 121It",,<:,1017, p. 21.
3 L. Joel, ~ Reallsme Iamedlat, Louvaln,

2
19~

~,
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nelther

tba~

lt lnclud •• lt (the d018atl0 posltlon) but take.

buman knowledge slspl, a8 1t presents ltselt, with a totall,
unbla.ed slnA.
Acoording to Mar1taln the orltloal queatlon 18:
'Whl1e thougbt presenta lta.lt trom the flrat .a guaranteed

-

by reallt, (as8uree sur les cho.e.) and .e.sured b7 an .s.e

.

lndependent ot thought It.elt, how 18 one to Judge lt, how,
under whlch oondltions and 1n what meaaure lt 1s that wa".l
Rolland Go.sa11n apeaks 1n the a.e wlae: 'Orltlque
wl11 take aa matter ot lta exulnatlon knowledge as lt prea.nts
ltselt 'pontaneous11. lt wl1l stu41 thla knowledge 1n the tree
plal ot 1t. develop.ant but wl11 re.erve the que.tlon ot lta
value tor a phllosophloal retlexlon'.!
The, all accept as their startlng pOint knowledge aa
l' present. It.elt, that 18 knowledge whloh 1. about extra.ental thlngs, but thel' all atrea. the neoesslty ot 1mpartlallt, and obJeotlvlt, ln the orttloal axaalnatloA.
1t pre.ent. It.elt 18 reallatl0.

Inowledge.s

fbi. ls the reall .. ot the

aan on the street, the unphl10sophlcal or nalve .e.ll ...

tllson'. orltlcl. wo\lld be; how oan lt be a real
4IQoftatratlon ot reallsa 1t the polnt ot departure 18 alrea4J
.eallatlc'

-

How oan a real1stlc pOlnt ot departure ever b.

1 J. Karl taln, Le. Degree. du Savor, Parl.,1932,
P. 142 (trad. The Degree. ot lnowl,c1Re, iiew'o'rk, 1938,., p. 89.
S H. Rolland QOss.lld; I ••~ ~ I!! £tuQa
Sr1tlgue ~ !! Oonnal.sance, Par1" 1932, p. 14.
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called an

i~artlal

or obJeotive one?

The answer to the tlrst questlon 18 that there is DO
real demonstratlon 1n the sense ot a deaonatratlon whlch oan be
put ln a syllogism.

The value ot knowledge oannot be proved

that way.

The or1tloal realists agree on that.
be demonstrated', says Msgr. Iioel. l

'aealism oannot

.

The critioal investigation whlob takes plaoe by .eans
of retlexion 18 nothing els_ and cannot be anrth1na el.e than
a becoming consclous of som.thing whloh already vas there, and

ot whlch the 1ntelleot vas air_ad, somewhat oonsolous ln a

vague and \UDsclentltl0 wa,.
Everybody knows that lntellectual knowledge reveals
truth about extramental things.
knowledge as such.

the lntelleot prelents its

This is the knowledge ot the ordinary

He is consolous that he knows extramental thlngl.

not a sOientiticall, founded knowledge.

Se

.an.

But this ls

never exaain_4 it.

And in taot, it might happen, that, when he •• t an 1deallst

who showed hl. the dltflcultles tbat arise trom thlnking that
knowledge deals with the extraaental world, he would start
doubting whether it doe.

10

at all.

Theretore, philosophers

Itart an impartial and obJeotive examinat10R ot 'hls ooaon
oonlciousness 1n order to investlgate it there il real11 a
toundation tor it.

-

1

,.

L. Noel,

!t! fl!all .• I ..."d;at, p. 27.
"..

- 41 Hoel put lt very clearly ln a leoture be gave at the
<II

Sixth Internatlonal Congress tor Philosophy at Harvard ln 1926.
MEvery Judgment implles a comparlson between thought
and thlngs. It also 1mplle. an eleaentary retlexlon
whioh makes that comparison and toraulates lta
results. £plstaaology has nothing aore to do than
to retraoe ln expllclt and technioal te~s the steps
ot that elementarT retlexlon·. l -fhe affirmatlon that

~he

Intelleot attains reality

is always there but lt Is not a crltioalll examlned atflrmatlon.
As a basis for solenoe or philosophy It Is useless.

It oan

easily be shaken by doubt.

Solentltlcalll oonalder.d, lt 1.

no more than an hypothesls.

Another hypothesl. Is 14eal1811.

When an examinatlon has been Instituted, this examlnation bl
way of a reflex10n shows that the tormer popular conviotion
was right.

Atter thls oritloal retleXlon the atflraatlon 1.

detlnlte and prov1des a sound base for further speoulatlon.
Durlng all the tlae of the or1tlcal Inv.atlgatlon the
phllosopher remalns oerta1n ot reall .. , but thla cert1tude la
outslde h1a phllosoph1cal Inqulrl, aa loel expla1ns 1n hia
anever to G1lson.

It ls a natural and instlnotlve oertitud.

or an attachaent to tradItIon, but phllosophicall, .e mal be
~d to be not oertaln. S Solentltloall, we may sar thatthere
1. doubt.

-

1

lbl~,

p. 273
,/

2 ReV)l.f .eo!-Soo:tastl9!" 1940,p. 51
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Sp.ce prevents

U8

trom treatlng extenslvel, this

question ot doubt, but nevertheless we must s.y somethlng
about it, as 1t is intimatel1 connected wlth this lmpartlal
attitude at the beginnlng ot the epistemological question.
Some authors indeed mean nothing els8 by thelr doubt

than thil obJectlvity or lmpartlallt1 to be observed ln the
lnvestigatlon.

Magr. Farges define. hls doubt as "a mere

abstainlng trom takIng sldes ln order to make our examinatlon
absolutely iapartIal M• 1
thIs brlnglng ln ot the term 'doub'- may have be.n
mleleading and have caused the lmpresslon that the, borrowed
more from ldeallstl than they actuall, 414.

!be tera -doubt'

.oreover underwent quite a leries ot ohanges in ltl use by
fhomistlc eplatemologlsts, and we do not Waftt to prove that lt
d1dnot have, at least in

BO••

ot thea, a greater element ot

ldeallstl0 thought than waa Justlfiable 1n a reallstiC
phl1osoph,.
However, doubt or no doubt, tbe impartlallty of the
investlgatlon waa the thlng that realY counted, and doubt m&7
have been stressed too much Just because ot the importance ot

'he objectivity.

There val a tlme when the question ot doubt

·'.med to be the all lmportant question ot ep1steaolog1, and
tountless were the oontr1but1ons wr1tt.n about It.

'aQ Rlat'8

Nov

oanalualon is that the question ot doubt 1s

------------------1 Van Ri."

Ip18tamo10118, p. 232.

8. mere
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questlon of words whloh has held too long the attentlon ot
<It

the Thomlstl0 eplstemologlsts and whlch would deserve to be
detlnltel, dropped trom crltlcal d180us810ns-. l
The maln polnt ls that thls crltlcal .xamlnatlon,
though lt ls not a demonstratlon ln the strlot sen8e of the
word, nevertheleas, proves reallsm bT way ot a retlexlon,
maklng lt a 801entltloally Just1fled oonvlotion.

The reflexlon

ls " 81noe the tlme of Plato and Arlstotle a 01a8s1cal prooedure
of solentlflc lnQUlrr,.2 It ls a real Judgment ot what take.
plaoe ln onets oonsolousnes8 ln order to detera1ne the valldlt,
of knowledge.
Gllson sAJS ln hls a'all ..e Thoa18te that not everT
retlexlon has to be orltlcal and that Ksgr. Joel ls wrons ln
lupposlng that lt doe.: "It 1. certaln17 a poor orltlque, which
CODslsts ln the becomlng oon.olous ot the taot, that what was
lamedlatel, evldent tor tbought, was lndeed 1. .edlate17
eVldent l .! Gl1son bere over.laplltle. the teacblng ot the
orltloal reallsts.

The retlexlon doe. 40 so.etblng more, vlz.

1t ls a real Judgment on the value ot knowledge, and glve. a
lolentlflc ba.e to reall...
Oalled a crltlque.

Because ot tbat 1t can be r1ghtl,

It oerta1n11 contlrms the reall .. ot the

la'elleotual act, but thls oontlrmatlon 1. not Juat a alaple

-

1

~,p.

637 - See al.o p. 338

2 Van Steenberghen, ipiateaoloSl, p. 32
,/
3 E. Gl110n, Reall ... Thoal.te, p. 75
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repetltlon.

~It

ls a sclentlflc Judgment, and ralses knowledge

to a hlgher level, sakes lt an approprlate ba.e tor .etaph1s1cal speculation.
The phl1osopher does not have to take tor his or1tlcal
lnvestlgatlon the .ere conoept, abstract1ng tro. lts relatlon
to reallty.

The oonoept as suoh 11 not that whlch the slnd

natural11 presents to UI.

The 1ntellect alwa1s presentl It.

knowledge as the knowledge of soa.thlng; at the .aa.tl.e that
the concept ls prelented, reallt1 11 'presented ln the ldea.
As St. fhomal sa1s:
'Speolel lntell1g1bl1e., qulbul lnte11eotus
pOlslbl1l. tlt ln aotu, noa BUnt obJectua
18telleotu8. Non enl. Ie habent ad lnt8l1ectua
slout quod lntell1g1tur, le4 810ut quo lntell1g1t.
Manlfestua elt 8nla quod lalentl...unt de his
quae lntellectul lntelllg1t. auat aute.lclentlas
de rebus, non de speClebus, vel lntentlonlbus
lnt8111g1b11bu8. l
.
The oonoept al suoh wlthout that relatlon ls so.ethln, wh10h
hal already been worked upon; lt 1s not the tlrs' datua.

The

oonoept as suob ls, theretore, not an lapartlal or obJeotlve
po1nt ot departure tor a or1t1cal examlnation.

The natural

data ot the lntelleot have alread1 been lnterpreted b1 the
.1nd.

The mlnd i8 no longer an unblased observer and lnter-

preter of what the lntellect presents to 1t.
The obJeot ot examlnation ls the oonoept al lt
prleents ltselt, w1th 1tl whole oontent.

-

1

St. Thomas l!

~lb.

But the oonoept 1.

AI

ftn1ma, III, lect.8

~--------------------------------~---,---------,--------------~

- 46 nothlng elae than la thlng In us'.

IIts tlrst 01&1.· as

Marltaln sa,s, "1s to be nothlng else but the thing Itselt,
the extr..ental belng, the ontologlcal object, transporte4
Into us l • l Spontaneousl, ever, Intellect ls real18tl0. We
oould not take anotber startlng polnt wlthout oea81ng to be
obJectlve.

'The thlng Is glven at the same t1me a8 the object

and througb lt, and 1t 18 absu~ to vant to separate Itl.2
Thls does not mean, however, that we already are
sure ot the results ot our Inqulr7 at the bellnnlng.

Our

startlngpolnt ls tbe reallstlo one, but our conoluslon alght
theoretloall, vell be Ideallstlc, as far as our Inltlal
attltude 18 conoerned.
lmpos81bll1t, ot It.

Other oonslderatlons ma, prove the
What ve want to .t,.es8 ls that ve 40

not prejudge the caa..

There Is no preJudlce whatsoever ..

to the result. of the lnqulry.

The, depend on what tbe

er1tlcal examlnatlon shovs us.

The result of the Investlgatlon

vl1l be the tacta that ve tlnd the initlal and Ipontaneous
rea11sm ot our intellect reall, Justltled.
lon ve know e!eliclte and
the Intellect teaohes

-

U8

~n ~ctu

Atter the retlex-

s119ato vhat ever, act ot

iapllclte and exero1t~.3

1 J. Karltaln, a'flexlons !B! l' Ifttelllgenoa,
Parls, 1930, p. 42.
2 J. Marl t&in, !:e.!! Degreel

!! Savor p.
t

181

3 Oh. BOJer, Cu.sus Phl1osophlcus, I, p. 113
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01'11, 18 the reallstl0 polnt 01' departure not a

partlal one, but lt appear8 the 01'11, tapartlal one.

The

ldeallst. are the on •• who oorrupted the questlon b7 devlatlng
trom the orlg1nal data.
thomlstic crltlcal reall .. otters a 'true and complete apolog, tor knowle4ge, whlch founds a reall_, not a

.

nalve reallsm, nor a neoor paleo-reall .. , but the e••mal
reall_, eternal 11ke truth It.elt',"
fhi. retlexloD also se•• s to be a real Judgment.

Although the Judge hl••elt ls a reallst, he ls, howe"er,
read, to
glve up hl. real!&a lt the lnqulry lead8 hla to It.
,.
Belng a reallst I!t.ght lead h1a to In,,lnclble dlttlcultl.s;
1t mlght aake knowledge alto.gether lnoomprehenslble.
wants to lnstltute an unblased lnvestlgatlon.

He

The lntelleot

tel18 hlm that lt talks about extr.. ental reallt7, but ls th1s
801

Could not lt be that thls was an elluslon?

Indeed manl

.erlous phllosophers, 80.e 01' them atter a lltetlme ot 8tud7,
thlnk lt ls.

Are the7 wrong?

wants to tlnd out.

!his 18 what the phllosopher

Theretore, he wants to examlne the aotl"lt7

ot the lntelleot and pronounce a Judgaent.

a real crltlque, a real Judgment.

It ls, theretore,

fhls word crltlque 11 not

aore or lesl aeaningless ln Thomlstlc crltical rea11 .. , a.
111101'1 seems to hold.
Far trom uslng the word cr1tlque on17 or maln17 tor
apologet1cal reasons, the Thomistlc crltical real1sts use lt

r
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In the ••anlng It had tlr,t In 1de.ll,tl0 thlAkers, 1.e., In
the aeanlng ot an lapartlal Judpent ot hUJIara knowledge.

fhe,

tMIlk that thls crltlque ls a good el.ent In Ideall_ and In
taklng It and Incorporatlng In Into thoals. the, belleve
are contr1butlng towards tho progress ot fhoal..
that Gllson t

•

~he,

'lbo, think

41et_! He who start. wlth lant or De.carte, Is

bound to end up vith lant or De.oartes 18 onlf partlall, 'rue.
Ideallsts 11k. all other philosophers are notwronl all the
wa, through.

Among thea are .0.' ot the mo.t g1tted ph11oso-

phers ot all times.

There o,rtalnl, are elements 1n thea

whlch can be u ••d.
Hodern Thomlsts, aoreover, are aware ot the danger
lurklng In a questlon whloh concern. tbe valldlt, It.elt ot
phl10soph" a danger more serlous here than In other branohe.

ot phl1osoph7.

A mlsstep, the In ••rtlon ot a wron, prInolple

would endanger the llte ot philosoph7 ltselt.

And not onlr

that, but It would have consequences tor revelatlon as well.
Stl11 the, th1nk that Desoarte. and lant made thelr
oontrlbution to the evolutlon ot hUllan tbought, that the,
brought so.ething Ink phllosoph" whlob had not been there betore, whioh may glve man a tuller understandlng ot truth.

And

although it did not do so in the syete.s ot Desoartes and lant
'heaselv8s, becaus. lt vas mlxed wlth too .uch error, stl1l the
element Is there.

And vhile the1r own .,steml onl, show

t'tleleneles and tailure, their true greatness appears 1n
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fhomlsm whe» thelr contrlbutlons are used tor the fuller
unfolding ot truth.

As Msgr. Noel says: 'Desoartes and Kant

once and tor all taught phllosoph1 sGaething wblch oonstltute.
an essentlal progress ot huaan though'-. 1
Take the case ot Descartes.
Father ot modern Xaeallsm.

Undoubtedl, he 18 the

As .Glleon polnts out, 14eallam

was born on the da, when he decided that the math..atlcal
method should be tbe •• thod ot Ph11osoJ)h1. 2 !he IIlathe.atlcal
method prooeeds trom thought, not trom reallt,.

It abstracts

B1 taklng thIs .ethod, theretore,

trom concrete reallt,.

Descarte. loosened the bond ot thought wlth realIt, and tbe
gap wblch was thus opened between rea11ty and thought was

~

Inste.d Of taklng .a his poInt ot

grow wlder and wlder.

departure that wltb whlch and In whlcb was the obJect 1s gIvan,
the natural presentatlon ot the lntellect, he tirst .evered
thought trom 1 t. obJect and then made this artltioial stat_ent
hls polnt ot departure.
Thls 1s the mtstake ot D.soartes.
nothing to do wlth the questlon as suoh.

But this has '

Desoart•• was rlght

1n asklng the quest10n whether the Intelleot vas an 1nstJ"WIent
tlt to attaln truth.

In h1s tlm., the perlod ot deollne ot

loholast10 phllosoph7, there certaln17 s •••• to have been
l'eaaon to put the questlon.

-

ae

was r1ght 1n look1ng tor

1-

L. 10"1, .&! !fal1e.a X_edtat, p. 23.
2 E. Gl1eon, The Un1t: of Phllosophical
New York, 193 p. ch:-TII.
-- -1

aft
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lnoontestable polnt ot departure tor •• tap1'l,81cal speculatlon.
<II

~oglto

ae oould have been rlght, alao, ln taklng

ot departure, thoug1'1 ln his assertlon that the

as his polnt

qOil~!

ls the

only lawtul polnt ot departure, hi. error alread, beeo_e •
• &nltest.

Reallt7 18 1.plled ln eyery thought, not onl, 1n
-.,

the thought whloh has the lelt a8 lt8 obJeot.
-~--~'

had a wrong

no~!ollt

.

But De.oarte.

.--.,

ot thought and, therefore, he put a

legltlaate questlon the wrong wa,.
Hls aathematloal preoooupation had made hi. 108.
the natural notl~n of knowledge, tor 'knowledge
as lt appears immediatel, to ltselt 11 oons010tteness •• 1s an act whioh 18 domlnated by an object.
It 18 an aotlvlty marked by:reoeptivlt, and even
b11passivlt7. It ls a splrltu__ ~ oonsolousness
wh1eh, through \CO tpo ....l organs, openl 011 a
corporeal vor141.
For

De8cartes~novledge

ls not open, lt 18 closed.

Stlll, as Noel expla1ns, ln h1s tlrst work he s.ems to have
bad another notlon.

There he speaks about thought contalning

1'&allt,.2 In thls early stage hl. crltloal inqulry would
have led h1m to a reallstic phllosophy.

But graduall, thought

and reallt, grew tarther and farther apart.

In th1s stage

there was 10glcall, no escape trom 1deall ...
The fault ls not 1n h1s questlon, whlch was a l8g1tlaate one but 1n hie try1ng to solve 1t from a prejudiced polnt

1 Van Ste.nberghen, £platemol0!l, p. 147.
2 L. loel, Le Realls.e Imme41at, p. 43-46,
whel'& we tind a substantlal oll'itIoft trOll !Seloar'•• , anal,.ed
bJ Msgr. lioel.
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ot vlew.

Tn. questlon oan be 801ved by one who

app~oache.

lt ln an unbia.ed way, taklng thought wlth what lt laplles,
the obJeot.

-Not even tor one moaent does the orltla! reallst

tace oertltude. whloh mlght be purel, subJectlve, 1.e., wlthout
an obJeot,.l
"-'.
In Desoartes we aust dlstlngulsh that ln whloh he
was rlght tro. that 1n whloh he was wrong. It does not se••
neoessary to borrow the wrong with the rlght.

Orltloal r.allstl,

thought some ot the. went too tar 1n the beglnn1ng, th1nk that
they oan ra1se h1s quest10n, about the valld1ty ot huaan knowledge, wlthout glvlng the .... anavar, beoaus. the answer val
not oauled by the questlon but by approaohlng lt 1n a preJudlced wa,.".
Though we should not torget the enoraous 4aaage:
Desoart.s lnfllcted upon .odern phlloloph1 ln belng the trallblazer ot ldeall .. , we oan also agree wlth Noel when he lay.:
'We believe that Descartes rendered a real .ervloe to the
progress ot thought·.

2

What 1. true ot De.oarte. ls true al.o ot lant, who
aarked the .econd etage ot ldeall .. , the stage ln whloh ldeal1 ..
beoame oonlclous ot ltlelt.

P. 4:41.

More expllo1tly than Desoarte.,

1 J. de Tonquedeo, Orltlque
2 L. Noel,

~ ~'alllme

!! !!

Oonna188ano~

Iamedlat, p. 134.

r
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(ant

ralaed~tbe

questlon ot the valIditl ot human knowledge.

But wherea. Descartes was Intluenced by mathematlcs, Kant's
preterence .ent to ph,slcs.

ae wanted to glve phl1osoph1 th_

same stabll1ty as solence had.

Only synthetical a priorl

Judgments, he olal.s, oan glve It thls stabl11ty.

Theretore,

Kantts questlon 1s 11alted to the posslbll1ty and!oondltlons

ot a prlorl Judgments.

More c.learlf than In the cas_ ot

Descartes, we can .ee that lant's 8tandpoll'lt w.as th_ Id_allstl0
one.

81nthetlcal a prlorl Judpents are Judpents whloh by

detlnlt10n have only a very 11mlted relatlon to reallty.
are

const~otl~nl

The,

ot the mlnd In whloh the role ot the object

18 a mlnor one.

We are not surprlsed to hear that thil 1nyestlgatlon
led to Ideallsa.

It 11 Ideallstlc trom the beglnnlng.

Here

agaln the tault 11es not 1n the questlon but 111 approachIng
the questlon wlth a preJudlced alnd.

~ho.lstl

can ralae the

'antlan questlon, raake a orlt1cal examlnation ot the power.ot
reason, .ake realon Its own Judge.
It waa laok ot knowledge ot tradltional reall •• that
.ade Desoartea and lant put the que.tIon the wrong va,.

But

it oertalnly la not true, that he who put. the Kantlan questlon,

hal to glve the Kantlan anawer, .s Gllson sa, •• l
,

When Fr. Regls wrlt •• that the Carteslan and Kantlan
P081t1ons are 'conaequences whlch result trom a .etaphls1cal
1

/

E. Gllson, Realls.e Thomlste, p. 108.
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postulate .. to the nature ot the real-,l

we entlre1, agre.

wlth h1. but we do not see how thl1 Ihou1d torbld UI to
conslder the .... proble•••• Desoartes and lant.

What he

sa,s ls that the, brought .etaph,sloal 1'08tu1&t88-- el •• ents
whloh the, did not J)rove and oould not prove, beoause the,
were 14e.11&tlo-- lnto the problem, and by dolng

.

the lssue,

.0

oorrupted

But ln po1ntlng out thelr error 1n not treatlng

a quest10n the! wa,

it

should be treated, 1n not tak1ng an

lmpart1al obJectlve attltude towards lt, he doe8 not oandean
the questlon lt8elt.
th1a ls lndeed the 41stlnot10n that has to be aad.
between the question and the .ethod by whloh 1t Ihould be
answered on the one hand, and the solution on the other.

It

la very well pOI.1ble <and ln the case ot Desoart •• lt hal
1ndeed happened) that other e1 •• ents have orept In.

.elther

the question ltselt nor the .ethod ot orlt1oal 1nve.tlgatlon
oan be held responslble tor thelr ideallatlo 801utlon.

tne

tault 11es in oerta1n presuppositlons, ln a preJudlced att1tude, laplled nelther ln the question Itselt, nor In the
a.thod.

Crlt10al rea11.ts agree that the, raise the ....

probl ... a8 Descarte. and lant, and the, a180 take their
a.thod (the searoh tor an lnoontestable polnt ot departure 1n
phl10soph1, the lmpartlal!', ot DesoaJl'te., be lt oalle4 doubt
Or not, and the or1tlca1 . . .lnat10n ot knowledge ot )tant);

-

1

L. H. Regls, St. Thomas .nel !RlstomoloSl, p.86

r
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but they

ol~.

1maunlt1 trom Carteslan and

Kan~tiaa

error.,

because these are not neoessarily connected elther wlth ;he
questlon ltselt nor wlth thelr methoda, but were 'the results
ot metaphys10al postulates, as to the Bature ot the re.l l

•

The, tollowed trom a vrong notlon ot Jtaowledge vhlob V.I
already there when thel approached
. the questlon, and v1tlated
the lolutlon.
I
When Regls
wrltes that he calls attentlon to the

opposltlons and lrreconcllabllitl ot Th~las and I4eall .. ,1
everlbod, agrees wlth hia.

All or1tloal rea11st. know that

there is a basl0 oppos1t10n between Ideallsa and Tho.l ...
What he should prove ls that those elements the orlt1c.l
reallsts borrow from ldeallets are oontrar1 to Themi ...
Cr1t1cal reall.ts dlffer trom ldeallst. even as tar as the
lnitlal attltude towards the problem.

An overall-condeanation

ot ldeallsm does not hlt the posltlons of the oritlcal reallsts.

-

The tact that the express10n 'orlt10al Real18J1" 1.
not older than lant hI make 1t auapect, but lt certalnlr 1.
not reason enough to oondean lt, as Gllson seeas to do.
Gondemn the tena 1s ultra-collservatlve.

To

No Thoalst should den7

his system the opportunlt7 to protlt b1 the progress ot human
thought, wherever 1t ma7 be toull4.

aesldes such an att1tude

vould make Thoml .. appear to be an ant1quated s1st .. whloh doe.

-

1

~,

p.

s.
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not keep

up~wlth

modern times.

But, however It may appear,

!homlsm also realll becomes poorer when It retuses to oonslder
the problems which confront modern man.
Gl1son's seoond obJectlon agalnst crltlcal reallsm,
vlz. that It makes metaphyslcs dependent on ep1stemology, haa
the same foundatlon as h1s f1r,t one.

Taklng as h1s start1ng

. polnt h1s def1n1t10n of cr1t1que, he sa,. there must be an
unbr1dgable gap between .etaph'~lost and ep1stemology.
Ep1stemology Is the a prlorl lnvestlgatlon ot the po!er ot
human knowledge.

10 reallstl0 prlnoiple. oan be used In 1t,

because that would make the Investlgatlon worthless.

A

sclenoe, however, prlor to the science of belng, Is a contradlct10n to a Thoalst.
But when one

,
I

th~s

that a critloal examlnatlon trom

a reallst1c standpolnt does not lose anythlng ot Its or1tical
value, there Is a llnk between metaphyslcs and eplstemolog,.
In regard ot the plaoe, however whlch splstemolog,
should ocoupy there 1s no ·agreement among fhomists.
lIust make 1t part ot metaph,slcs.

Gl1aon

Karlt.aln, though a orltloal

reallst, makes It part ot metaphYslos too.

Se glves two

reasons tor thls- -Eplstemology supposes a long oontinued
ettort to know, not only so1entlfl0 but also ph11osophio and
Pl 7oholog1cal, 10glcal and metaphysl0al-. l Theretore,

-

,

.

1 J. Kar1t1an, iegrees

~

Knowledge, p. 96.

eplstemology~oannot

- 55 be the prelt.lnary oondlSlon ot philosoph,.

The second reason 18, that -to glve eplstemology a separate
exlstence aa a dlscipllne dlstlnot trom metaph,slcs, ls to
lnterpose a thlrd term b.tween realls. and Id ••ll .... l Although
"'Ain~
Marltaln reaa.
• crltloal reallst, he .eeas to be here under

the Intluence ot Gl1son.

Hls vlew se••• to be amblguous, It

is tar trom clear.
Hls conclusion is that there ls 'Interdependenoe
between epistemolog, and .etaphyslcs.

Eplst.mology, according

to Maritaln, Is prlor In one order ot caus.s, .etaphysics In
another, aocordlng to the prlnolple ot oaulae
!unt oaus.e.

~

1.D.Ylaem,

That there il a oertain prlor1t1 ot epl.temolog1

he atate. explicitl,: -In the endeavour to po.it an,
Just 1deal ot speoulatlve philosophy and ot the
two tJpioall, distinot degree. ot knowledge lit
1aplles- the philosoph, or nature and .etaph,slca1t is 1n ettect neoeaaar, to tre.t tirat ot all
ot noetles, and to establish a certaln nui5er or
propo.lrtlons oonoerned wlth the much more general
problem ot the relation between thought and
reall t, •• 2
--,
How oan Marltaln hold that there 18 no 41"lao'lon
between metaph,slcl and .plstemologJ atter suoh a atatem.ntt
The d18tlnctlon b.tween the two seems Indeed obvlous.

It 1.

the same dlstlnctlon there ls among the dltterent phl1osophical

p r lnclple

1 J. Mar1taln, Degrees £! Xnowledi., p. 92.
2 Ibld, p. 98. The applloatlon ot the
of caus.e ax-Invlcea 18 explained on p. !8.Gl.

r
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cosmology, psychology, aetaphls1cs.

All treat

ot belng, but all conslder a d1tterent aepect ot that

b!~ng.

Metaphyslcs ls a sclent1fl0 lnvestlgatlon Into the nature ot
belng, what belng lSi epIst ••ologl 1. an Investlgation Into
the Questlon whether our

lntel~~ct

questlon oan be sa14 the

qUe8tl~n

ot the Intellect.
gu14!!!,

wha~

attalns belng or not.

whether bellaS ls the

Its

ob~eot

Metaph,slcs has tor Its obJeot the questIon

belng, tbe object ot the Intelleot, ls, and

aplatemolog, the questlon !!!!!, whether
ot the lntellect.

be~g

1s the object

It 1s clear that eplstamolog, Is prIor to

metaphyslcs beoaus. metaphyslcs starts wlth \be presupposltlon that beleg Is the object ot tbe Intelleot, a questIon whloh
Is solved by ep1stemology.
Theretore, we oallnot agree wlth aegls when. he
says: 'fhe whole neo-soholastlc eplstemological
problem oonslst. preolsel, In establishlng that
the knowledge ot common sense 1. true, 1 ••• ,
that 1t has a oerta1n belng •• Its obJeot. But
It belongs to metaph,slcs to detlne belng .s
belng and Its dlverse aodes; and that ls why It
belongs to metaphIsICs to e.tab11sh the reall ..
ot oommon s.n •• ••
It .etaphyslos oonslders belng as belng and Ite diverl' modes, It doea not oonslder the relatlon between belng and
knowledge.
~elatlon

Theretore, eplste.ololr whlch considers that

ls a disciplin. dlatlnct trom aetaph,slca.

Certalnl"

the object ot eplstemology 18 not eomethlne outelde belng; but

• 77.

1 L. K. aegls, ~~. Tho.~ ~ Ep18t_oloSl,
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'hi.

then the obiect of an, .clenoe cannot be out.lde belng.

argument, then, would prove that there 1. onl, one dlsclpllne,
1.e., .etaph,.lc ••
Nelther ls 8plst_o10gy part ot peloholo.,.

Both have

the .... materlal obJ.ct vls. huaan ltnowl.4ge; but whereas

p.,eholog, conslder, human kno¥l.dge under the aepect ot It,
struoture, eplstemology cons1ders lts value.

!be, dltter 1n

thelr torsal object.
Psrcbolog, anal,ses the acts ot knowledge, inqulre.
into their ontological .tructure.

Ip18t_olo81 oon8148r8 the

act. ot knowledge tro. Mother .tandpolat.

It d08. not COD-

slder those act. ln themselves, but ln thelr relatlon to
somethlng .lse, 1 ••• , the extrasentat world.
lovestlgate what. l t

It tpl •• to

&11" 18 tbe relat10n ot our knowledge to

extr..entat belDg.
P'rcholog, and .pletemolo«1 are dltt.rent disciplines
ot phllo80ph,.

tlon.

It

The, have thelr dltterent fleld. ot obeerva-

m., happen that ln a certain era one 1s hlghl7

developed whil. there are hardl,
Other.

anr

veatlge. at allot the

Medieval Tholllate abow th18 p1ctl.lre.

The adVaIloe4

Itage ot their P81cholas, should aot persuade u. to put thea

on the 11st of ep18t08ologls'..
have

-

au., thls

Van Steenberghea ••••• to

mlstake ••s vas po11'lte4 out ln the lntJ'oduotlon~

1 Introduction, p.4
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Pl7chologr and epllteaolo81 are not so Independent,
however, that the teachings ot pa,oholo87 4.0 not have anY'
Influenoe on eplstemolog,.

On the oontrar7. there 18 an

'lntl.. t. oonnectlon between the two dlsolp11ne..

So muoh

10,

that a speolal pSlohologloal explanatlon ot the struoture ot
the aot of knowledge, can aake a realistl0 ep1.t_olog1
Impos.lble.

Xeroler va. not entlre1, wrong when he treated

eplat_oloD .s a part ot palcho10Q.
At the root ot the Cart.81an and .Kant1an eplataolo-

gloal errors we tlnd a1.cencept1ona about human knovle4g.
whlch perta1n to pSl0h0logl.

Hl.underttandlng ot the •• chanl0

ot the human Intellect made thea go

eplsteaologJ.

.8,ra, 1n

the tleld ot

Thesl 41801plloe. are Interre1at..

depend on one another.

The,.

A .1.take aad. In one must nece ••arll,

lead to talse oonoluslon. In the other also.

But tbat doe.

not prevent u. tro. oalling thea 41tterent 41.oIplln •• , alnoe
-'.'''-

the, all have thelr own tleld ot &ctlvltl. thelr ewn toraal
obJeot. so.etl.e ••ven thelr own .ethod b, whlOb thel 41tter

one trom another.
There 11 another d1801pUne wlth whlch eplate.olog7
11 related. vlz. 10glo.

But tor the ....

reaSOD

It has even been called lep,ga ....10;r.
that it 1. DO part ot •• taph7alc8 or

P1 lcholog,. lt 1. no part ot 10g10 elther.

The obJeot ot 10glo

1, human knowledge but lt doe. not oon.lder thl. knowledge 1n
1'1 relatlon wlth rea11t1. but .,rel, 1n It.elt.

It 18 a

----------------........
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praot1oal s01ence and Its purpose ls to t1nd the rule. whloh
have to be observed In order to &rrlve ..t 1oorreot knowledge.
It compr1ses the techn10al part

or

It •••• know-

knowledge.

ledge as an 1nstrwaent and 1t teaches aan hoW' to u.se thl.

lnstruaent 1n a oorrect wa,.

It doe. not Inve.tlgate In the

value of hUDlan knowledge, but taltes that

tOl'

crantM.

Eplstemology 1. not a praotloal sclence but a
speoulatlve one.
a theorr.

Its end 18 not

to

teaoh rule. but to prove

IncIdentally, tbe speolal epIste.olol1 (1n contra-

dls+tlnction to general eplsteaology) provide.

al80

rules to

be observed 1n the d1tterent kInds ot knowledge, beoause it
laY8 down the cond1tlon. under wblch th.se varlou. klnds ot
knowledge are trustworthy.

Its onll end, however, 1. to

Just1ty the knowledge It ••lt.
Eplateaolosy, pS7oholo81 aDd 10glo ue s1ll11ar 1n

thelr materlal obJeot wbich ls human knowledge, but they 41fter
1n thelr tonal object, the
th1s knowledge.
struoture;

a~eot

under whlch tbe, oons14er

PB7oholog7 oonsiders It. nature or ontolOgical

10glc ltB technlcal structure ln order to find

rules for Its oorreot u•• ; eplstemology oonslders not 1ta
ttruoture but Ita valu•• Thereln It d1ffers botb troa ps,choloS'

and 10g1o.

Theretore, 1t 1s better not to call 1t

~osloa

or Psychology but to give It 1t8 own nu. of Eplst.molol7.
is a disc1p11ne 41tterent tro. all other ph1losophlcal
41 l clpllnel.

KaJgr
It

- eo Ae tor the place It should ooouP1 among th .. , even
those authors who do not want to oall It a dlsolpllne dltterent trom .eteph,s1c. want to see It treated at the beglnning

ot .etaphralcs.
This goes wlthout .a11ng.
alwa1. aust co.e betore the

qu~stlon

The que.tlon t!! J!!'
'quid .1t'.

Eplstemologr

treats about the questIon '!n s1!', whether belng Is the object
ot human knowledge.

The aclentltlc value ot human knowledge-

whether human knowledge attalns reallt1 haa to be eatabllshed
betore thie same human knowledge la ueed In sol.ntltlc InY.atlgatlon.

That thls can be done wlthout call1ng In questlon

nalve reall .. has been shown alreadr.

flrlt epllttmologr

solentltlcally ,atabllshe. the taot that human knowledge
teaohe.

about belng, atterwards .,taph,alol telll ua what

UI

belng 11.

But auat we not know what belng Is betor, .e oan

flnd out that the human lntelleot really attalnl It, alk those
who lide wlth Gilson?

Must not we tlrst .stablish that our

lntellect ls a tlt Inetruaent to lead us to beIng, is the
questlon ot the orltioal reallsts.
Thls Is the sam. problem which appears ever7Where
In phllosophr where the question '.!!!.!!!' must be consldered.
Row can one talk about the exlatenoe ot a thing betore knowlng
what It ls?

The aame questIon arlaes in natural theology

Where the existence ot God haa to be proved betore the questIon
l~hO He ls, and the dltflculty ls how this can be done.
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.

io ln eplstemology the questlon ls whether huaan

knowledge attalns belng; and thls questlon haa to be treated
betore .etaph,a1cs, whlch treats about tbat belng.

The

solutlon to thls probl .. ls that we need not have made a
metaphysioal lnqulry lnto the nature ot belng.

A ooaaon

knowledge ot what being ls, ls, sufticlent to taokle the problem.
The treatlse ot .etaphysic. later wl11 certalnly clarlty what
has been treated ln

~lst..ology,

ln the . . . . .87 •• the

treatlse about God'. aatur. ln natural theology wlll clar!t1
what has been sald ln the tlrst chapter where 818 exlstenc.

wae belng proved.

Episteaology sheds lts I1ght upon aeta-

physios and metaphysl0' doe. the .... for .p1.teaology, beoause
they are lnterrelated.
Metaphysics does not se.m to be necessary tor
epist.mology.

What 1s required 1. onl1 a oommon non-ecientltl0

knowledge ot reallty (belng) and an tapart1al attltude, wbloh,
as has been shown, imp11es a

CI.

re~lstlo

p•• ltlo••

Does not thls then de.tro, the prtmac1 ot metaph,slos'

By no .eans.

ot metaphyslc.?

What do .e understand b, the prlmaoy

Pr~o7

ot •• taph¥.lo8 .eans that .etaphyslc.,

because lt treate ot belng, whloh 11 the t1rst and deep.s'
not10n, oovere the tleld ot all other 101ence. ln a wa7.

The,

all cons1der belng under eome Ipeolal aspect; aetaph,a108
tonl1dere lt a. belng.
Oil

all other aolenoes.

theretore, metaphyslos aheds ltl I1ght
Xetaph,81oa 1s the queen or s01enoes.
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In a

oerta~n

war

all other aclenoes are dependen' on •• ,.-

physlcs,' aa metaphyslca gives the ultlmate explanatloR ot
all reallty.

In this eplatemolosy whloh tre.ts ot beinl

llke the other onea, la dependent on metaphyslcs a180.

But

trom another polnt ot Vlew the dependenoe &&7 ••11 be the
other way.

The speoltio

qU.8~10n

tor eplataology ls not

about be1ng as belng, b\tt about its relatlons to knowl.dge"
C<J

The very eXistenoe ot .etaphys1os depend. on these relatlons.
fh1. 1s the lnterrel,t1on ot the so1enoes whlch 1s posslble
beoause ot the dltterent klnds ot oausality, oausae !! ...In-.v....1.....o_e...
m
sunt oausae.
-"*
Xetaphyslos and ep1stemology are 1nterrelated; but,
ln the order ot belng, metapb7s1cs oerta1nly has the pr1aaoy
over ep1stemology aa over all other 801enoes.
The conclusion is that there seems to be no contradlctlon here elther.

As already was being polnted out,the

aaln error ot Gilaon ls a wrong notion ot oritlque.
to

~

'lhls seem.

the beginnlng ot the whole trouble.
Kaybe1t 18 posslble to tlnd a Itill aore protound

reason ot Gllson's error.

Van Iteeraberghan pOints out that

Gilson detlne. belng aa that whloh is ontologloa11, lndependent
of consclousness. "Gilson ls wrong in taklng "I'eal' to .ean

10.'th1ng ontologlcal11 independent ot consc1ousness and
OPPoslng lt on that accounttG the 00g1to.
inoludlng the C081tO.

lverrth1ng ls real,

The d1st1nct1on ot an obJectlv. real
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from a subjective real 18 glven Just as lamedlatel, aa the
dom1natlng character of the object.

But the ontologioal

lndependence ot the obJectlve real, with re.peot to the aubJect 18 not at all eVlden,-.l
&

quest10n of stre...

All this .eea. to be vel', much

Gilaon never sa,a expllolt, that the

idea has no rea11ty, but when he apeaks about reality he .eans
extrasental real1ty, independent ot the 14ea, the object a.
such, and not the obJeot as object.

ae

opposes too muoh

though' and reall ".

AcoordlJlg 'lo hl. the danger 1a • ex&l tel'
1& reallte de. ldee.-. 2 Th1s had it. rep.rcu.11onl on hls
.olution ot the epistemological probl.. , according to Van
Steenberghen.
The only sound p01nt ot departure tor a Thoalstic
eplstemology ls the COftoept a. the 1ntellect presents 1t, the
conoept whlch hal not let been worked upon by philosophere.
Th1s conoept 11 presented not only al a tora ot the alnd, but
as a tOl'll whlch hal a detlnl te content.

Thls conoept provldes

a base tor a orlt1cal lnTestliatlon ot husan knowledge whlch
must satlstf everybodl who 1s not preJudioed.

As the oa •• of

the ldea11st. and, ln the fho.latlc oaap, of Gllson ShOWI,
however, 1t seems to be extp•••ly d1fficult to adhere to thie
lapart1al polnt ot departure.

-

1

F. V. Steenberghen,

~p18te.olo'l.

p. 97.

,/

also p. 177 note.

2 E. Gilson, Reall ... th0a1.te, p. 75,

I .
I

'

!

·.
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CHAPTER III
GILSON'S POSITIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
It, as Gilson claims, there cannot be a critical
approach to the epistemological questIon, 1s there realI, an
epIstemological quest10n let"

It would seem that one either

has to Instltute a oritlcal 1nvestigation 1nto tbe relat10na

between knowledge and realIty or aake a postulate out

or

them.

The statement that there 18 no plaoe tor a oritique, tor a
Judgment ot knowledge in real1 .. , that reall88 11 Indefensible,
seems to leave no other p08sIbIl1tl but to accept reall .. as a
postulate.
GIlson eeeas to hold soa.thlng 11ke thIs 1n hI.
"
/
b! Realism.
Metbod
lgue.

There he sa,8: ·We see no other

alternative nov-A-days than to glve up all •• taph1sIcs or 00••
back to a pre-oritical r.all .. •• l A few pages betore he had
.tated: ·Scholastlcl .. attirae the exIstence ot an object,
dIet1not trom the subject, mor. lUte a postulate than l1ke a
ooncluslon tt • 2 Iadeed there .eems to be no alternatIve than
thls, for where 1s the eplsteaological probl .. , it one has to
aooept realIsm as • postulate?

1

E. Gileon,

2

~,

1:e!

p. 10.

./

/

aeall ..l! Xethod1g,ue"

p. 15.

-1
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drew th1s oonclus10n 1n h1s paper on Thomistlc

Eplstemology at the Seoond Internat10nal fhomlstlc Qongress at
Rome ln November 1936.

There he atated:

-The leglt1maoT ot ep1.tamolog1 has beea oalled
lnto questlon by outstand1ng thlnkers •• One auat
reJeot every eplstemology, get rld of the probl ..
ot knowledge whloh 1s only a talse problem-,I
The context ot th1s'statement pOinted toward Gllson,
and 1n his Reall~e thomlste !! Cr~tlgue

J! l!

gonna18sanoe

the latter defended hlmselt and ma1d that he d1d not den1 the
leg1tlmaoy or neoesslty ot eplsteaology. but only Hsgr. Noel'.
method ln ep1stemology.2

He sa,8: -It 18 evldent that ever,

ph1losoph1 oan and must ask itselt about the problem ot knowPlato, Aristotle, Salnt thomas and mant thinkers ot
the K1ddle Ages did the 8am8. 3 There ls a real problem ot

ledge.

knowledge, but the solution haa to be glven 1n •• taphls1ol.
There is no real eplstemology as a d1so1pllne dlstinot tro.
metaphysios.

On the other hand, he sars alsc

Thomlste that the existenoe ot the
problem.

ext~aa.ntal

,;'

lil ~all •••!

world 18 no

The tact that 80ae philosophers make 1t a proble.,

does not mean that 1t is a real probl...
extramental world il evldent.

The existenoe ot the

It oannot be denled exoept 07

those who v1ew It trom a wrong pos1tlon and dontt admit ltl

-

1

L. Noel,

It! aeall ..e Ieed1at, p. 282.
/'

.

2 I. G1lson, Reali ...
3

!!!a,

~o.l.te,

p. 36 note.

p. 84.
"

, I

.....
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evidence.l~ But then one asks oneselt, it the existenoe ot
the ext ram en tal world i8 not a probl .. , what then is the
epistemologioal problem, whioh Gilson

8&YS

does exi8t?

Is

not the epistemologloal probl.. the quest10n whether our
knowledge really attalns extramental reality, as 1t sa,s it
does?

And does not thls mean.the questlon or the exlstenoe

ot the ext ramen tal world?

'or Is It not our knowledge which

unites us with the extr..ental world?
In Realisae Thoalste G1lson expllcitly denles that
real1sm 1s a mere postulate.

He detlnes a postulate as a

propositlon whioh one 1s asked to adm1t a8 true, but wbloh il
ne1ther evident nor demonstrable-. 2 For a realist the existenoe

ot extramental real1t, ls ev1dent and, thererore, cannot be
a postulate.
Gllson's posit10n In epistemology hal not been the
same trom the beglnn1ng,

al

ha8 been lndioated already.

There

18 progress, even between the two books ot 1936 and 1939.
attltude toward reallSM has ohanged.
the tltles.

H18

This Is evident even trom

While the tirst 18 called Method1oal Rea11sm,

which words do not leave any doubt about the Intentlons ot
the author but Indloate what 18 golng to be derended, the .econd
book ls Just plaln Thomlstlc Reallsa.

1

~,

p. 236.

2

~,

p. 194.
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Gl1son's changes are mls1eadlng even tor hls tollowers.

ThuB Fr. G. Smlth wrltes 1n the Maritaln volume ot the

Thomist: MAs to the lS8ue itaelt, - do we or do we not know
eXistents, - it 18 one whose resolution is anterior to
demonstratlon and selt-evldenoe.

It cannot be proved, d18-

proved, named selt-evldent 9r a postulate-.

1

This 1s mix1ng up Gilson's oplnlons ot the various
perlods.
and

80

He alway. held that lt oould not be demonstrated,-

do the orltical rea11sts, - but whereas be oonsidered

lt more aa a postulate or a method to be u.ed 1n his
~ea118m.

~e

Methodlgue. ln his Realls•• Thomlat. the .tress talls

on the evidenoe.

Moreover it a thing oannot be deBonatrated,

and 11 not evldent elther, and oannot be accepted al a
postulate, what else ls lett'
As we dld ln the tlrst ohapter .e shall treat the
two books apart and glve tlrst an explanation ot Glleon'.
epistemology as 1t oan be round ln hla b! Realisme Xelh2dlgue,

.,.

and then a8 it appears 1n Reallsme Tho.lste.
REALISME HETHODIQg!
Gllson wants to go back to the posltlon or Tho.lsm
~

betore

mode~n

t1mes, because !homl .. ln modern times hal

deViated bY' looklng too much to ldealla..
anoient Thomlsts and 8t. Thomas himselt?
~ea11ats.

What were these
Undoubtedly thel were

Thelrs was the sound rea11sm ot a healthy reason not
1

In! Tho.lst Harltaln Voluae p.

248.

I
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yet corrupted by modern decadence.

They ne.er asked the.selvel

the question whether the Intellect wa8 an apt 1nstrument to
teach them about real1t,.
precrltlcal.

Thelr reall .. wa8, .a Gllson

S&18,

It certa1nl, was not a oonclusion after a

scientiflc invest1gat1on into the struoture and act1vity ot
the lntellect.
St. Thomas'

It vaa more of a postulate.

metho~

One oan sa, that

ln ph1losoph, was real1sm; a method about

whioh he d1d not ask himselt

an, questlon ••

Gilson wants to go baok to thi. attitude, us1ng
realism .erely as a .ethod.
tl t1e

Theretore, he gives hls book the

.&! ReallSJ1le MethodlgufP or Methodical Reall_.

His

concern Is to tlee the danger. ot ldeallsm and the retore
his urging: wBaek to the Mlddle Ages-.

·Scholastiel .. 18 a

conselous, retlected and Intended reallsa, but a reall •• which
18 not based on the solution ot a prob1ea, rai ••4 by ldealls.,

becaus •. the data ot th1s problem lmplr necessarlly ldea11sa

&. Its 8olut1on,.l
"In 1930 1 , writes Van Riet 1n

~·Epl.t.mologle

thomlsts, "Thomlstlc reall .. Is a purel, methodical rea11 ..
tor Mr. Gllson; 1t Justit1es ltselt onlT through conslderatlona
drawn trom hlstorr".2 fh1s 18 ~ll1 ver, muoh the case 1n 1936,
the ,ear ln which

~ ~ea11 ..e

.e!hOdlque appear,.

1 E. G11son,

~

."

Reallsae

/

K1storr show.

~ethod19ue,

p. 11.

2 Van R1.', ~t'pllt'molO!l. Thoalste, p. 514.
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that 1dea11 .. does not lead to a satlstaotor, phl10soph1 but
on the contrary ls the gat ..., to sceptlcl.m.

Theretor., let

us stlck to the attitude ot medleval fhoml .. and u.e reall ..
as a .ethod, w1thout asking anI quest10ns.

Wew1ll have to

choose between methodlcal real1 •• wlth the Balvatlon at
.etaph,slos on one hand, and oritloal rea11 .. with the ultimate
los. ot metaphYslos on the other.

The lound .ethod ls to

start trom realls., becau.e m.taphls101 18 sate wlth It.1
'Ideall •• shows lts lmpotence to oonstruct a vlabl.
phl10s0ph1·. 2 flme and agaln Gllson lnslsts on the sterillt,
ot modern phllosoph1. 3

Soholastlc reallsm, however, 11 'the

reallsm ot the traveller, who proceeds towards a goal, and,
seeing that he approaohes lt, trults that he took the rllh'
dlrectlon l

•

4

All thls does not lound ver1 oonv1nclng.

His cr1tles

reproached Gileon that 1t looked more l1ke praaaatlsa.

W. are

rea11sts because reallsm is the best foundation tor a
philosoph1, or as Gilson s&7s '1t leads to a 101enoe as .ell
to a •• taphysics; there tore , 1t ls a sound .ethod to .tart
v1th , • 5
a8

1

i. Gilson,

2

-

3
4

5

~

~

,-

Reall._ x,!thod1gue, p. 86.

ibid, p. 12

1bid, p. 51, 83.
ibid, p. 16
ibid, p. 88.
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Practlcal reasons, however, never were much 1n tavor

1n Thoaiam.

'l'rue ph1108oph7 inqulres lnto the aature of thinge,

the ultlmate oauses.

Truth 1. l1s cr1terlon, not u ••fuln ••••

It 11.&1 very ".11 b. that a workable hJPothes18 tuma out not

to be the true one.
It .ee.. that Gl1son doe. not have a fir. oonv10t10n
at thls stag..

A doctrin. oan elther be proved, or it 1.

evldent, or lt has to be aooepted .s a hJpOth••1a or a postulate.

Gllson was sure that 1 t oould not be proved.

lt evldent, but on the other hand he doea not want

aecalll

'0 atr•••

thll, beoause be ls aware ot the tact that too • .., aerioue
phl1osopher. do not a.e the evid.noe at all.

It c.rtalnl, 1s

a strange thlng to oall a dootr1ne ev1dent when 1t 1a
den1ed 01 man7 out.tandlng phl1osoph.rs.

thlng wrong wlth the evidenoe.

~lnl

There must ba

10•• -

Theretore, no other alternatlve

rema1ned tor bim than to sa, tbat 1t va. a poatulate or hJpOthesl. or method.
in lts workab1l1ty.

The proof tor a hr.pothe.l., bovever, 11e.
So Gilson vas brought to In.er, this

strange element in hi. philosophy.

He inyokes a prassatlc

Justlticat10n tor a tbing he alread7 oalla evident.

'!boalst10

reallsm ls based on the ev1denoe ot 1tl prlnciple, and Ju.tlrlea itselt b7 a crltiQue of ldea1168 which 'howe the i.potence

or

-

this dootr1ne to construct a vlable Ph1lo.ophl,.1

1 lb14, p. 12.

- 71 w.e can tlnd the . . . . .ort ot r.asons, inlplred by
pragaatlsm in Reglsle MSt. !homas 4lld Kplste.oAoerl.

H.

looke tor a satlstylng .xplanatlon ot the unlty and plurallt1
w. tlnd In the unlvers., and conolude. b, say1ng that Ideal1s.
18 wrong, because 'lt exclud •• the dlverslty ot the real'.
At which an Ideallst wl1l prob$bly answ.r: ISO wbat?

1

fhll ls

what the questlon Is about'.

Ivery Ideallst know. that hls

87ste. makes reallt, unique.

A retutatlon cannot take as Its

polnt ot departure the thing that has to be proved.
"
When Regla
.ays that fhomlstlc realls. 1. the only

reallsm that truthtul11 takes account ot the oOllplexlty ot
human knowledge,2 ever1bod1 wl11 agree wlth hl., but another
questlon Is, whether It ls true beoause ot that realon.
Thomlstl0 real1 .. ls not true because It 1. a .ethod ot whlOb
the workabl11t, oan be Ihown afterwardl.
When somebody obJeots that by reJeotlng orltlcal

"
reall .. he 11 bound to beco.e a dogmatllt, aegll
answers bl
polntlng to a oertaln evldence: 'there 1. a wlldom whlch take.
account of the reallstlc Inatlnct ot thls knowledge, ot whlch
wlsdo. wl1l make manlfe.t the part that 11 true'.

:5

Nowhere

I

I
II

J).

48.

1

'"
L. M. Regls,
st. fhomas

~

Kplstemoloil

III1
1,[

II
2

~,

p. 54.

I

I

:5

-Ibld,

p. 38.

i
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else

1n~18

lecture does he expla1n these er1Pt10 worda.

/

Begls's leoture show I the .... 8lxture ot .eal1 .. aa a .ethod,
as evldent and as a workable

Gilson's

~

h1Po~e81.

that we t1n4 1ft

'"
,aeall
. . . .ethodlgue.
./

There i8 not muoh that 1. po.1tl". ln YReal:J."•
./

Xethodlgul.

Thomlstic realts. detends lt8elt b7 showlng tbat

ldeallam oannot 1.a4 to .etmph,810'.

'It 14e.ll .. bat

suooeeded ln const1tuting a set ot .v14ent prino1ple. and

pre"ed 1tl .xp11eatl", teoundlt"

lohola,t101 .. would have

nothlng to obJeot,.l The Justltlcatlon ot fhoalstle reall ..
1s a negatl"e one.
Although he .entloRS r,tlez1on he 401. not sa, much
about It.

Thls ls understandable.

hll tplstemolog1 18 a 81nor one.

a.

fhe role ot retlezlon ln
He do., not •• ea retlezlon

the orltloal re.ll.ts 40.
Reallsa 1s e"ldent and lts ."ldenoe 1, provlded b,

a ••n.lbie 1ntultlon.

'fhe exl.teaoe ot the exterlor vor14

1, evldent, but b7 the concrete and dlreot ev1denoe ot •
len81ble lntuition whloh tran.lat •• it.elt 1n an abatraot and
dlrect W&1 lnto a JUdgment-. 2
The senslble experlenoe guarantee. the real1sm ot
our knowledge.
a.ntal reallty.

-

The .ens •• brln, us lnto contact wlth extraThl. ls evtdent.
1

!ill,

2

~,

p. 12
p. 48

Intellectual knowledge 18
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1t is a d1reot translation or sense knowledge,

lt 1s based on eense knowl.edge, and theretore, sharel in ita
realism.

It has no evldence ot ltself, however, but dependa

on the evldence or the aen ••• , tor, aa Gllson laTI, 'the
s.nalble 1ntuition alone guarantee. the exlstenoe ot lta
ObJeot-. 1
Th1s .enalble evldenoe has to be aooepted aa ••oh.

It cannot be transformed lnto a rational AeduottoD or induotlon.

10 demonstrat1on 1, poss1ble.

That would destroy

rea11.. again.
Th1. 1s all that

!r.! Reall ...
",

'"
Metho41g"!
001lta1.ul 1n

tbe vaT ot a pos1t1ve expos1tlon of eplst ••ology.

Ho wonder

that h1s opponents complained and asked hi. 1t there WAS much
d1tterence between this eplstemology and acceptlng reall ..
almply as a postulate.

Dld not Gl1lon hlasel! .&y that h.

aooepted 1t beoause of the dlsastra"l consequenc•• ot 1deal1 ..,
The ev1denoe 41d not sound verT conv1ncing.
REALISME fHOHISTS
Accord1ng to R. Verneaux 1n ~·Ep1It"olOS1. !!

~ Gilson l the epistemology ot flllon would oonslet ot thr••
part.: tlrst a crltique ot the attempt. ot concorAl .. , 1 ••• ,
a refutat10n ot those thlnkers who derend reall .. by a.anl of

-

1

E. Gl1son, aeall ... Tho.l~te, p. 195 - 196.

2 Itlenne G1180n, p. 218.
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a crltlque

knowledge.

~f

Gl1son calls thea ooncordlat, beoAu.e

they Intend to reconcIle !haal .. wlth lantl.. and Oarte,lan
Ideallsm; aeoond11 a critiqu. ot 14.all .. , b1 abovlng that 1t
Is based on a aere pre.u.ptlon and that lt neo.asarll, lead,
I

to loeptlo1_; thirdl, a posltlve e%pestlon of knowledge not
defendlng lta realltm but

8how~ng

how e8n.ltlve and Intellectual

knowledge attaln reallt,.
Gllson' e rea11_ aocording to Veraeau ie a .ethodloa
dogaatlc and retlexlve reali...

W. alread, aav that ln thl.

second book the str ••• tall. aore on It. evldenoe than on It.
belng used as a .ethod.
~

lmportance ln

Its belng .ethodlo&! va. a tactor ot

Riali_! Xethodlql1e. becau.e th.ereln Gll.on

aaw Its Justltlcatlon.

Afterwards, however, he bee..e aore

and more convlnoed not onll ot Its belng evldent, but ot the
tact that lts Justlflcat10n oould be tound ln Its belng evldent.
It atl1l can be oalled methodlcal reall .. , beoau.e the •• thod
Thoml.ts uae In thelrphlloaoph, 1s the reallstl0 one, but the
name methodlcal ls no longer oharaoter1stl0.

R.all .. does not

tlnd 1 t. Justltloatlon ln 1 ts belne u.ed a. a .ethod.

/I

It 1s dogaatlc realis., vhloh .ean. not that it 18 a
postulate, but merel, that l' caDnot be 4eaoDs'rate4.
eVldent; lt does not need a demonstratlon.
/

Gl1son oal18 1t

dogmat1c ln

Rea118m~

a

phllos0ph7 exoept 1ts reall .. ltselt.

~eallatlc

Thomlste.

It 1.

-Ever,thlng can be orltioal ln
That ls the

----------------............
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true poslt~on ot dogmatlc reall .. wh1ch we aetenA,.l
It 1s a reflexlve reall .. , the retlez10n maklng lt
a philosophical r.allsm, dlstlngu1shed irom the nalve reallsm

ot co. .on .ense.

This retl.z10n, how.ver, 1. not a or1tlqu.;

it doe. not e.tabllsh anything, lt doe. not dltf.r trom
other r.tlex1oft.

It la the

.~.

aft,

r.tlexion aa 1, b.lng u,e4 all

over phl10soph,.
G11son no longer uses the pragaatl0 argument. b. uaed
1n

~

,
'"
Realls.e
Kethodlgu..

Realls. 1s not the true a,st ..

becaus. lt leads us to a .etaph,slos, while ldeall .. does not.
Reall .. 1s true because lt ls evldent.

St111 the r.tutation

ot ldeall .. pla,s aver, iaportant role ln hls eplst..o1ol1.
When Gl1son descrlbe. the oours. that an eplstemologr should
tollow he ••ntlon. tlrst the Idet.ns. ot truth agalnst those
who contest the tlrst pr1no1pl •• ••

2

fhe second thlng to do, acoordlng to Gl1son, 1. Ito
let the tlrst prlnolple. appear 1n tul1 11ght, ln th.lr .vldenoe
as prlnclpl •• •• 3 Thls .tag. 18 what orltloal r.ali.ts would
0"1 the most lmportant part ot eplst_olocr, the eplstaologloal probl_. wheth.r human knowl.dge know. extr...ntal realltr
1 E. Gllson, Re.ll ... fhoalste, p. 160.
2

!:2!!,

:5

lli,!, p. 238.

p. 227.

I

I",
I
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or not.

<I)

They d1sagree, however, 1n the object ot tbe orltical

refleotlon.

80•• of thaa take the .ena. peroeptlon (G'n7, 4.

Tonqued.c) others the lntelleotual Judgment (Van ateenberghen,
loel) others the Goglio (Pioard) Itl11 others the tlrlt
prlnciple. (Marltaln 1n a wa,).

Gl1son 41 ..188 •• lt wlth

saylng that 1t 18 ev1dent. -And wben soa.bod, object. that lf
lt really 1s ev1dent lt ahould be ev1dent for ever7b04y, he
answers that even for 14sal18ta lt 1s evldent as .en, but 1t
,.

oea.es to be evldent tor the. a. ph11osophera.

Why 4on' t the,.

aocept the s... thlnge as ph1losophers as the, 40 al .en?

Th.

tact reaalns that 1t 1a evident, and he aakea u. lnstltute a
raflezion to abow that our aen ••• do not decelve UI,l though
he does not use the word rat18z10n.
The greater part ot hil epistemology is devoted to
the questlon how to explain the taot that our taoultie. attaln
reallty.

In Belns and !!!! Philosopher., whlch 1, a further

develop.ent ot his dootrlne, he .ua. up hi. poslt1on .s tollow••

'The two prerequi.ite. to the posslbillt, ot
exlstent1al Judgaents are that realltr should
include an eXistentlal act over and abo.e It.
essenoe, and that the huaan alnd be naturall,
able tograap it •• That the huaan alnd ls able
to grasp 1t 1s a taot, and it so .an, philosophers
s ... to doubt lt, lt ls becau.e tDe, tall to gra.p
the cognlt!ve power ot Jud....'·.
llbl~

p. 196.

2 E. G11son, BelQS
toronto, 1949, p. 202.

!!! I!!!

Phllosopher.,
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'1'ha t there 1s an extruen tal rea11 t7 and that the

human mind oan attaln It are the two prerequIs1t...
to Gilson the, are evIdent.

Acoording

The .aJor probl .. ot h1$ eptste-

mology oonalsts 1n explaining b2! the mlnd gra8pB thle real1t"
not whether the mlnd graaps It.

Or1tloal real1sts oaQ agree

with Gileon In his turther expos1tlons.

When the taot baa

been .stablished that the h\lll$Jl Intell.ot attaln's reall t7,
bo~

G1lson and the crltical rea11sts tollow the .... path;

bot have to ahow

~

tbe mlnd r.ach•• tbat rea11ty, In what

operatlon and at what polnt .xac,.,17.
For the tollowlng consideratlons It 1. ot no laportanoe whether one ls a orlt10al realist or not; the disousslon
takes plaoe In a further stage.

Our orlt101 .. ot Glleon 18,

theretore, not attected.We aalntaln that he 11 wrong 1n
condemn1ng the vay tollowed bl the or1t1cal rea11.,. to .stabl1sh reallsm and that h1. own pos1tion, even hls t1nal one ot
evldence, 1e an unlatlsfylng one, but "e thiU that b18
anal,sl. of the aot1v1ty ot the human 1.1.1180t 11

p~toun4

and worth cone1derlng, although aa ve shall expla.1n tUl'ther on,
lt pertalns more to Pl1oholo17 than '0 ep1at ..oloiJ.
It belongs to metaph,II01 to 'etlne what reallt7 or

be1ng Is and that 11, accordlng to Glllon, vh, it 18 part ot
.etaph7s1CI to desorlbe how huaaa knowledge attalns It.

In the

"cond chapter ve have explall'uxl what to think ot that vlew.

1'1
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1Ietapb,1101 t.aoh••

re.llt, real 11 exlltenoe.

U8

tbat the element whloh aalt••

Gll.on l

•

SelftS !!! 80••

1s a.evotea. to that problea ant b. give.

80.'

.e1"7

'hl1o,oRh.~.

p~to\U'ld

anA

reveallng exposlt1ons Oft the _&tt81-, showing how it haloDeen
treated bl the great••1 thlftkere throughout the hi.tort of
Ue point. out

~h11o.0~h1.

tha~

all tho •• phllosophie. whloh

d1d not acoept the aot ot eXlstenoe resulte4 ln fal1ure ••

The aot ot eXlstence !ben, hal to be attained b1
human knowledge,

ls where the

The .en •••

ii

lt would olal. to attain reallt1.

.tartl.

~robl_

~ero.lv.

fh11

Exl.tenoe 1, no .enslble quallt,.

on11 the aooldents, qua11t1. quantlt"

eto.,

they never penetrate into the .s.enoe ot the thiftg, .tl11 le ••
into exlstenoe.
~rop.rtle.

ot

The .enses only teaoh u. about the 60014..'al

~ini'.

On the other hand, our lntelle.hal uovle4ge 1.

ab.traot.

It work. wlth 14.... , conoeptl.

lIhea •• kilO" aan

intellectuall" our knowledge 18 true ot reall, exl.tlne • .a,
but lt 18 not verlfled

al suoh ln anr llving .an.

however, i8 alva1. oonorete.

Ixlltenoe,

There i8 no ab,tract eXistenoe.

EXistenoe 18, 07 definltlon, that what -.ke, the ••• enoe thi.
aotual concrete essen...

Oon ••quentl, there oannot be a
oonceptual abetraot knowledge ot eXistence. 1

-

Beins

~

1 L. M. Regll denles thi. 1ft an art1cle on
Soae Philosopbe,... Modern 80hooaan 1951,
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Existenoe, theretore, oannot b. the obJect or our

ordinary abstraot knowledge.

Thi. is preeis.ly what St. Thoa.s

says when he states that the object ot our intellect is
essenees. l Our oonceptual knowledge 1s about the qu1dd1tl,
obta1ned trom the phantasm bl seans or abetraotion.
cepts have only an lntent10nal exlstenoe.

Our oon-

They do not exlst

as suoh 1n reallty.
Ex1stenoe doe. not have a content, oontent be1ng
so.eth1ng ot essence.

Ex1stence doe. not add an1thlng to

essenoe; lt only makes the essence real, aotual.

As existence

does not prov1de a oontent ln the aotual thlng, does not add
to anythlng to lts essenoe, so it cannot give a content either
to an intentional existence 1n a concept.

We oannot reach

existenoe ln its ooncreteness ln the ooncept.
The questlon, theretore, remalna: how do we know
existence?

It oannot be known by our senses.

Our senses

glve us knowledge on11 about external aooldental appearances.
The1r knowledge ls in the order ot essenoes.

As a prinoiple

ot a ooncrete being 1t should co.e nevertheless under
1

afercep tlon.
The aotiv1ty ot the intellect on the other hand 1s
not perceptive but oonceptive.
ooncepts

-

by

It works

by

means of the concrete phantasm.
1

B!

mak1ng abstraoi
But ex1stenoe

Spirituallbus Creaturi8, A. XI. ad 7.

- eo belng the prlnclple ot a concrete thlng and Itaelt lndlvldual
too, should be percelved not concelved ln an abstract way.
The solutlon Is that existence has to be apprehended
In the senslble datum.

lIn order that a man percelve exlstence

wlth hls lntellect, It Is necessary that exlstence be glven
to hlm In an exlstent, whlch l,s perceptlble to hls .enslb111t1,.1

Exlstence cannot be percelved otherwlse than In the

actually exlstlng thlng.

But thls thlng ls only presented to

the knower by the senses.

theretore, In the exlstlng thlng

whloh ls present to the knower ln the phantasm, the Intelleot
must percelve Ita exlstenoe.

Thls Is a oertaln klnd ot an
lntellectual Intultlon, as Van Rle' observes. l It marks a

There he had only the sense perceptlon

substantlal development ot Gllson's eplstemology slnoe Le
Reallsme Xethodlque.

as hls explanatlon ot reall •• ; here It Is a sensltlveintellectual evldence.
When does thls Intelleotual peroeptlon ot exlstence
take place?

Gl1son answera: In the second aotlvity ot the

intellect, the Judgment.

'When the concept ot belng ls

abstraoted trom a ooncrete exlstent percelved b1 the san.es,
the Judgment whloh predloates existence ot thls exlstent
attrIbutes exlstence to lt In the wa, the Intellect sees It,
1 E. Gllson, Reallsme Tho.lste, p. 215.

e

Van Riet, AttEl!lstemolosl! Tholllste, p.509,
~J 0

iI' 0 b • -\-,,~) .
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1.e., ln the senslble datum trom whlch the intelleot abstract_
It ... l

·We directly know peroelVed data as beings so tha,
our d1rect knowledge of th.. inol_4e. an intultlve experience
of their very aots ot ex18tln,-.2
It is lndeed on11

1~

a Judgment that the lntellect

aff1rms exlstenoe ot an essenoe.

The abstract concept 'man l

ltself does not say &n1thlng about eX1.tence.

Exlstence ls

not given wlth the ldea, not contalned ln It.

fhls required

a second operatlon of the lntellect, the Judgaent.

Tben the

lntellect affirms: 'Han exlsts'.
fhis ls St. fhomas' doctrine, who writes: 'Prima

quid.. operatl0 relplcltJpaaa naturaa rel •• seounda operati0
reaplcl t lpsUIIl esse re1 •• 3

aut al 'both the e.sence and the

existence are necessarl for the real thlng, 80 also both aots
of the intellect are neoessary tor the . .plete knowledge ot
the tblng.

On11 when I have a oonoept ot a thlng and 1ft a

Judgment attrlbutlng exlstence to lt can .7 knowledge be lald
to be complete.

In reallt1 the, alwaYI go together, and 'there

are no concepts without Judgments nor an, Judpents w1 tbollt

conceptI.

Bot even tbe sl.ple apprehenslon of belng oan be

J).

207.

qu. V, Art. 3.

./

1

~.

2

E. Gilson, ael,ni

3

fhomal AQulnas, III Boethlua,

Ql1son, Rea11sme Tho.lst"
~

p. 225-226.

.!9.!.! Ph11olophera,
!!!

'rrin~tate.
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wlthout JUdgment·.

1

Slnce essence and exlstence always go

together In the world ot reallty, so ther must also go together
In the world ot knowledge.
Concrete exlstenoe ls not present to the Intellect
In Its concreteness, because the unlon ot thlng known wlth
the knower takes place br means ot • Ipecle. whlch Is the
abstract representatlon ot the thlng known.

Stl11, In the

Judgment the Intellect attlrms exlstence; and, theretore, It
must percelve it in 80.e way.
than In the phanta...

There

fhls oan be In no other wa,
and

only there, the unlon ot the

knower wlth the concrete thlng known takes place.

There.

must, theretore, be an Intellectual Intultlon ot cODorete
existence in the phantasa ot the .ense ••
The importance ot the Intelleotual Judgment appears
in this doctrine.

It ls the Judgment whlch glves the ultlmate

perteotlon to our knowledge.

Th18 18 entlrel, In accordance

w1th St. Thomas' teaohlngs, as Gl1son polnts out.

-The Judg-

ment Is the most pertect operatlon ot reason because it Is the
only on. that Is oapable to atta1n--belond the es.enoe ot
belngs whlch ls apprehended by the concept-- that Ips~ !!!!,
whloh Is known to be the very source ot all reallt y l.2

-

P. 209.

1 E. G1lson, Belni and Some Phllosophers,
2

E. Gllson,

~ Tho.lst~

V. ed, Par18, 1948
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Tlit_ lntelleet can percelve this oonerete exlstence
in the phantasm because ot the unlty ot the knower.

"Selng

1s nelther lntulted by a .enslbl11ty nor understood by an
lntellect, but known by a aan t • l Or agaln, aa St. Thoaas
says It: "Non enl. proprle loquendo sensus aut lntelleotus
cognoselt, sed homo per utrumque·. 2

.

Man ls not d1vlded ln separate oo.part.enta whloh
do not stand ln relatlon wlth each other.

A too speelflo

conslderatlon ln psychology ot the var10us facult1es mlght
lead us to suoh an oplnlon.

The unlon between the faoultles

ls not an art1flclal or tactltlous one, but the unlon of a
11vlng be1ng.

Phllosophy should never loae slght ot the

eonerete reallty lt studlel.
Intellect and lenae. are both unlted ln the 8ubJeot.
Thls makes lt pos81ble tor UI to accept thls lntellectual
lntultlon whlch must acoompany every act ot 1fttellectual
knowledge.
More and more modera Thoalst. layoke a kind ot
lntellectual lntu1t1on.

Marlta1n glve. a deaoriptlon ot the

states ln the proees. ot knowledge ln '.;;;;b;;;:;l;;;;;......
;s ';.;;e;.;;.;n.c...e
~xlst.nt·,

P. 106.

~

.!!!!

ln whlch he shows how the 1ntu1t1on take. plaoe:
1 E. Gllson,

~

Selns

~

!!!! Ph1losophers,

2 Thomas Aqulnas. ne Verltate Qu. 2.a-5. ad 3.
........

I

••

i
I
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The second stage is the -formation - in one
simultaneous awakening ot the intellect and the
Judgment, which mutually involve each other- 01
an idea ("this being" ror simply "this thlng- 1n
which the idea ot being 1s impllcitly present) and
a Judgment composlng the obJeot ot thought 1n
question with the act of existing (not with the
'not10n" of existence but with the Haot' ot existing):
"this thing exists or "this being exists".
In torming this Judgment the 1ntellect, on the one
hand, knows the subJect· as s1ngular (1ndirectly and
by reflexion upon the phantasMs) and on the other
hand, afflrms that th1s singular subject exerclses
the act ot exlsting. In other words, the intellect
1tselt exerclses upon the notion ot thl. subJeot an
act (the act ot atf1rmlng) by which 1t liTes
tntentlonally the ex1stonce of the th1ng. !hi.
attlrmet!on has the same content as the IfJUdp9ft,1
of the estlmative and the external sense (but 1n
thls case that content ls no longer -b11nd- bu'
openly revealed slnoe 1t 1s ra1sed to the atate ot
1ntelllg1bi11ty of act); and 1t 1s not by retlex10n
upon the phantasms that the 1ntellect proffers the
aff1rmation butt by and ln thls -Judgment· ltself,
and ln this 1ntultion ot .ense which lt grasps by
lmmaterlalls1ng 1t, in order to express lt to ltselt.
It thus reaohes the actus .ssendl (In JudB1ac)- ••
lt reach.s 8888noe- (1n oonce1v1ng)- by the m.dlatlon
of sensor1al peroeptton-. l
The solution of the problem 11es 1n the unlty ot human knowledge.

When we rea11ze that nelther the senl.1 nor the

intellect knows but that

.an

knows. that s.nses and lntelleot,

though they are dlfferent facult1es, are nevertheless the
tacult1es of one llving belng, we can understand the relatlo"
between them.
There ls a contlnu1ty trom senses to lntellect, a
oontlnuity that is

~oss1ble

beoause both are in the a.a. subJeot

1 J. Marl taln, Existence!!!S

~he

_i.....
xl....,8.....t.8".."...t, p.27

1
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fhls makes it posslble to under.tand how the Intelleot can reaoh
concrete reallty, whl1e It oannot express It in a concept. The
analysis of the cognltlve facultles and thelr operatlons show
UB

thelr structure and way of actIng, and a reallstic notion or

man as a livlng belng makes us understand how their combined
aotivlty grasps reality.
Thls posltlve part or his eplstemology certalnly
shows Gilson at h1s best.

Hls analysls ot the intelleotual

knowledge 1s profound and olear.

In a convinclng way

shows

h~

where and when exactly the human intelleot reaohel realIty.
H1s pertect realism lR another merlt or hls exposltion.

In

thl~

regard he ahowe hlmselt a true dlsclple ot

Bergson who f1rst made European ph1losonh, take the road back
to real1sm.

Bergson showed hlm, as he dld Marltaln and

10

many others, the fatal oonsequence. of Ideallem, and endowed
hIm from the start of hls phllosophloal aotivltles with that
passlon tor realIsm whioh was the oharacterlstl0 ot hIs own
philosophy.

In thom1sm, however, Gl1son found a sater and

more perfect reallem than Bergson oould g1ve him.

!homl88

still developed thls senae for reallsm, atter he got thoroughly
acquainted with 1t tor reallam ls .ssentlal 1n Thoalsm aa ln
no other eystem.

rhose other seekers ot realism 1n modern

I, I

t1mes, the eXistentialists, also had thelr lntluence on him 1n
maklng h1m more aware, where exactly to t1nd thIs reallty.
suooeedlng edit10ns ot

~

The

Thomls•• show this olearly •• Noonan
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polnted out ln an .xcellent artlcle ln the New Scholastlcl ...

1

<OJ

rlnally hls posltive eplstemology 1s entlrely based
on St. Thomas.

The many quotatlons trom hls works show oon-

v1no1ngly that lt ls tully ln conformlty wlth the teachlngs ot
the angellc doctor.

In a olearer and more expllclt way than ls

done by St. Thomas, the stress ls put on reallsm, tor, although
St. Thomas ls unmlstakenly a reallst, reallsm was never a
problem tor hlm.

Theretore, lt ls not brought lnto full

evldenoe by hlm.

Gllson presents the texts and shows their

oontent ot reallsm to tull advantage.

Ideal18m ln lts varlous

torms made Thomlsts consclous ot thelr reall...

Only ln the

presenoe ot the enemy truth reoelves lts proper ..phasls.
,'ar, then, trom orl tlcls1ng th18 part ot Gl1son' 8
Eplstemology, we oan only pralse 1 t a.s a real a("vanoement ot
Thomlstlc thought.

Crltloal realists can agree wlth 1t and

wl11 conslder 1t as a t1ne aohl.vea.nt whlch tlts entlrely
lnto thelr system.

In taot, .e tlnd the saae oplnlons as

Gl1son's In some of the1r worke though not 11l eo developed a
treatment.

Thus Magr. Noel already

had.

polnted to the

lntellectual lntultlon as a solutlon tor the questlon how the
lntellect contacts reallty: 'In the reallty ot our psyoholog1cal 11te, there are no two awarenesses, the one senslble, the
other lntelleotual, but only one whlch ls both at the same tlme.
1 John Hoonan. 'The Exlstent1all .. ot E.
Gllson'. New Soholasticlsm Oct. 195O;-p. 4i7-i3§.
-- --
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There 1s an intellectual qua.l-lntuitlon ot the realitle.
present to sens1ble experlenoe l

1
•

One questlon could be asked, however, vlz. it this
part ot eplstemology does not more belong to psycbolog7 than
to eplstemology.

Ep1stemology, 1t 1t wants to be a d1so1p11ne

distinct trom psyohology, should have a dltterent toraal object.
The lnqulry lnto the value ot human knowledge ls, as has been
shown, a question whloh apparently does not oome under
psychology.

However, when we start analyslng the lntelleotual

aot ot knowledge to tind out how lt attalns reallty, .e are
already 1n the tield ot psychology, the tormal object ot whloh
is the structure

o~

the ontology ot human knowledge.

also Van Rietls oplnlon:

This is

'Our opinion 1s that the ontology ot

knowledge has no proper critioal value, but that lt transposes
and 1nterprets very well the concluslons or the desoription ot
the cognltive phenomenon 1n order to evaluate It.

In the

analysls one 'sees', in the ontology ot knowledge one
tunderetande·. 2
Th1s makes us understand also why Gl1eon oan produce
so many quotat10ns trom 8t. Thomas, because thls 1s psychology.
As was explained, 8t. Thomas has a hlghly developed psychology,
whereas lt wl11 be extremely ditt10ult to tlnd texts ln h1s

~homlsm',

P. 154;

1 alt. In: ·Some Tendencles in Modern
by Dom Illtyd Trethowan:-»ownelae Revlew. Spring 1949,
2 Van H1et, Ep18temologle Thomlste, p. 656.

,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . .11-2-$2•..JL.iJ
• --
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work ot • strlotl, eplstemologlcal charaoter.
However, the dlstlnotlon cannot be atretohed too
tar.

As the object 1s glven 1n the act ot knowledge and there

1s no act ot knowledge posslble wlthout an object, ep18teaology
and pS1oholog1 oannot be entirel, Independent ot eaoh other.
There Is and always must be an lntlmate oonnectlon between the
two.

Wben we torget th1s, we tall agaln In the old error whloh

was the oause ot Ideallsm, viz. oonslderlng as d1stlnot In
rea11ty, what ln real llte Is one.

We oannot oonsider thought

wlthout the obJeot whloh It Implle., oonslder1ng thought
wlthout Its object made Desoartes the Fatharot Ideallsm.
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-IV

GENERAL CONCLUSION
In the Introduotlon to

~elng ~

!2!! Philosophers

Gilson wrlte. that It Is talse to thlnk that "tundamental
philosophlcal oppos1tlons necessarlly happened between truth
and error, instead ot being b.~ween partlal truths and the
whole truth·. l The history ot Chrlstlan phl10sophy Is there
to prove thIs statement.

From the earllest 4&1e ot Chrlstianity

when the ApologIsts looked tor contlrmatlon ot thelr falth In
the worke ot Greek. phllosophers, phl1osophy hal always started
w1th an examInatIon of the pagan phl1osophers (Plato and
Arlstotle), separatIng truth troll error and adaptIng the truth
in their syste. or building their syste. wlth ita aid.

There

has been no more diligent searcher tor truth on all places in
whioh it could be tound than the greatest ot Christian
Philosophers, St. Thomas AquInas.

HIs was certalnly not the

attltude of the conaervatlve m1nd, whlch teara to agree with
propos1t1ons ot pagan phIlosophers because ot the error that
may be contained in thelr syste.. He was the tearless champ10n
ot truth; and It 1s doubttul that ve vll1 ever tlnd out what

he had to endure because ot hIs Intrepld stand.

Then as well

as now and in any t1me, the large army ot the mediocre kept the
fleld; true progress never came through the ma8se •.

pIX.

1

E. Gilson.

Belng

~ $o.~

Ph1losophers,
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'" It is astonlshlng, however, that one who 1n hil
books proves to be such a devoted dlsclple of the great
master, and is well aware ot the presenoe of truth am1d error,
dev1ates troa this att1tude 1n ep1stemology.

for here he not

only condemns ldeall .. but seems unable to dist1ngulsh any
element ot truth ln 1t.

He ieems not to be aware that ldeallsm

also, as all other erroneoul system. betore 1t, may oontribute
ita share to the turther progress of human thought.
everyth1ng ln Descartes and lant 18 error.

Hot

Why then oondemn

them completely and refuse to exam1ne these great ph1losophers
to see 1t 80me truth mlght be found 1n thea whioh oan ba
lncorporated 1nto the pattern ot !boalstio philosophy'
Phl10sophy 18 a 11vlng science.

There oan be no

golng back to Plato or Aristotle or even to the Middle Ag•••
Truth is eternal and there ls no change ln 1 t, but the human
race ls developlng and phllosophy happens to be .9!l trut!,!,
but vha t man grasR8 9.! truth.

Every tllle has 1 ta own preble.a.

The phlloBOphy or another tl •• vlll not tlt, or not tlt ent1rely
to thls tlme.
The epistemological probl •• i. p,tecullar to modern
time..

Whether thls problaa is the reault ot a per10d of

decadence ln the study ot ph1loaophy ls not important; the
only Questlon 1s whether or not lt 18 a lawful question.
Gilson hia.elf denle. that he haa ever 8ald that the
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eplstemo1og1oal problem vas a talse probl ... l

But lt it ls

a lawtul Quest1on, lt should reoelve an ansver trom Thomlstl0
phl1osophy. There oan be no golng back to a preorltloal
stage. 2 Thoml.m has to adapt It •• lt to the requlr.. ents ot
the modern mlnd.
That ls what most .Thom1stlc phllosophers aav qulte
clearly and what led to crltlcal reallsm.

In ordinary 11te

everybody 1s a reallst, even the ldeallst. are.

But 'what

men so lnfalllbly know qua ••n, they so otten overlook qua
ph11osophers-. 3
But 1s not there then a way to show tha1
th1s real1sm ot ever1body 1s solentltlcally Justltled?
Or1t1cal real1sts thlnk there 18, and that Is exaotly the way
Idealists use 1n the1r attempt to prove their 14eal1 .. , Via.
the cr1tlcal examlnation ot buman

knowl~ ••

Emmanuel Ohapman glve. an excellent aummary ot it:
'The orude knowledge ot genu1ne common .en.e, charged
wlth ontological densitl •• , unrefined as y.t by the
apecial teohniques ot the emplrloal and aathematlcal
sciences, must be defended philosophioally again.'
both the Ideallst and the empirlc1st, who w1l1 ftot
admit any knowledge as valld other than what conforms
w1th the1r preoonce1ved not1ons. the ph1losophy ot
oritlcal realism does not d1smlss, nor look down
upon, but Justltles, what 18 valld 1n the presolent1tle knowledge ot oommon .en ••••

p. IX.

/'

1

E. Gilson, Reallsme

2

i. Gilson, ~ Reallsme Xithodlgue, p. 15.

3 E. Gilson, y eln s!9S

4 E. OhApman,
Marl ta1n Volume ot the Tholllst
•

~ho.iste,

Is!!

p. 36-note.

Philosophera,

-'nr.
0 Be - -!hat -1s -the Answer.

l

•
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To institute this cr1t1cal examlnatlon ot our know-

ledge, that ls what Kant and Descartes taught modern philosophy.
Although they were wrong 1n the concluslons the, drew, thelr
error prooeded not trom the question ltselt but trom the taot
that they did not approach 1t w1th an unblased mln4.
Everybody wl11 agpee that 1deall88 1s a real danger.
Thomists should always b. on their guard against It.
oertaln that In the past

80..

It 18

ot them have gone too tar 1n

the1r adaptatIon and thereby have endangered

~ho.l...

Nothing

1s more contrary to the splrit ot Thomlam than Ideallam.
Although some mlstake. were made when a reawakened Soholastio1 ..
was oontronted tor the tlrst time w1th the problems ot modern
phllosophy, the outstand1ng Thomlsta ot our tl.es are avare
ot the danger.

They are unanimous In orltloal reall ...

That'Gl1sen has a special concern w1th realIsm 1.
understandable. He wltnessed the struggle tor a realIst1c
philosophy ot hls master Sergson.

He shoved hlm the deplorable

state to wh10h two oenturle. ot Ide.llsm had led European
phl1osophy.

It took the glgant1c ettorts ot sen1uses l1ke
c..

Bergson, Husserl and others to make Europen ph1losophy oonso1ous that
. 1t had been 1ntested-hi ldea11sm as by a oentagiou•
dlsease.

And notw1thstandlng all 'he1r etforts, ldeall_ 1.

tar trom dead but 8tl11 has 1'. chaIrs 1n the promInent
unlversltles of Europe.
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Gllson 18 aware ot the danger 1dea11sa contalns tor
phllo sophy , and that accounts tor hls repeated warnlng ••
Modern Thomlats certalnly appreolate these warnlngs, especlally
when the come trom an authorlty 11ke Gl1son.

But when these

warn1ngs become aotual aocusat10ns, and Gllson says that they
have already tallen 1nto Ideallstic error, crltlcal reallata
thlnk that he Is wrong.

Caretul readIng ot thelr treatlsea

ahows how caretul the, have been to avold thls error, how they
never lose slght ot the danger ot ldeallam.
The tact, however, that there 1s danger connected
wlth orltlque does not make them retrain trom 1t, tor they
thlnk that although ·orltlque may have been born trom the
19norance ot tradltlonal realism*,l

it beoame neceasary,

nevertheless 1n modern ph11osophy, and does not oontaln In
ltselt anyth1ng wh!oh 18 1n oontrad1ct10n with 1t.
The merlt ot Gilaon's works ot episte.ology lies 1n
the posltlve

par~,

the analys1s ot the act ot knowledge.

Gllson shows his orattmanshlp.

Sere

These pages are tull ot

penetratlng lns1ghts 1n the structure ot knowledge, and betra,
the man who has been a constant reader and student ot St.
Thomas' works tor years.
Gllson·s later works as Be1ng

~!2!! Phlloso~her.

and L'Etr• .!! L'Essence, are the further de"V'elopment ot what
can be tound alread1 In aeallsm. Tho.lst. !! Crltlque ~
1

!!

"
,,L. Noel,
ReVie Neoscolastlque,
1940, p. 58.
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Conna1.sanie.

In a more extenslve way he explains there the

ex1stentlal value ot human knowledge.

More and more he

becomes convlnced that onlT aotual contact ot our lntellect
wlth the concrete exlstenoe can oonstitute a genulne knowledge
ot rea11tl. and that th1s oontact takes place 1n an 1ntellect-

ual quasl-lntu1t10n.

H1s exposltions there are oertalnll a

real progress over the earller explanat10ns ot crit10al
rea11sts, though the, also have been aware ot this and stressed
the lmportanoe ot the Judgment in epistemology.

In Gilsonte ep1stemology, 1n a tuller sense than 1n
the precedlng cr1tical epistemologies ·ph1losophy becomes
agaln the full lntellectual actlvity ot the whole man controntlng the whole ot experience M •

1

Thls was also what philosophy was tor st. Thomas.

He

never had the probl .. h1m8elt, "Ne1ther Arlstotle nor St. Thomas
telt the need to qual1ty them.elves as realists·. 2 But the
philosophy ot St. Thomas 1s certalnly areallst1c one.
whole system asks tor a realIstic 1nterpretation.

H1s

One cannot

explain 1t ln an 1dea11etlc war without deetror1ng 1t.

St.

Thomas ls one ot the Mgreat rea11sts' aa de Tonquedec calli
theB;3 he is the greatest ot them.

Thomlst, p. 136

1

E. )( • Chapman.

2

J. Marltaln.

The Haritaln Volume ot the

...........

Degrees

-

~

I

.....................

Knowledge, p. 87

Connala.ance, p. i49~' de Tonquedec. ~ Orit1que ~!!

------------------............
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Thererore, or1t1cal

~eallsm

can appeal to St. ThQaa ••

It 1s ent1rely 1n acoord wlth hlm and oan be called a further
development or Thomlstlc prlnciple..
on a question asked by moderns.

It Is a Thomistlc Answer

The fact that we do not tind

1t 1n h1s work 1s no reason to reject 1t.

It would be It 1t

could be proved that reall .., 1s 1n contradlction to Tho.lltlc
prlnclples.

St. Thomas'. 81stem shows a gap In this relpeat

that he has no eplstemologl.

Modern ph1losophers have the

'ask to glve a solutIon to problems whlch he hlaselt never
consldered, provlded thl. solution 18 1n acoordanoe wlth hII
prlnciples.

Th1s shows the greatness or hls philosophy and

Its value tor all tl.es, that every age oan us. 1t to tlnd
the solutlons tor It. partIcular probleas, tor 'the greatness

ot a ph1losophy comes from Its aptItude to reach beyond the
problems 1t poses, and to trIumph over those 1t dId not even
suspeot'.

1

Thomlste, p. 518.

1

H. Oouh1er, 01t: G. Van RIet.-!RlstemologI8
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